Secularism: a concept in need of reappraisal

The secularisation paradigm which had dominated the consensual social science view of religion until the last two decades, has undergone much revision because of its ethnocentrism (or European bias) and its heavy reliance on a reified understanding of the European experience itself and its application in North America. But the reappraisal has further to go, for it is not the empirical, quantitative assessment of secularization which is in question, but rather the very definition of the religious and the secular, in the light of massive changes which have been taking place in the social and cultural fabric of innumerable countries. Beyond the incidence of faith, belief, religious observance and affiliation and the like, there are issues arising from the volatility of religious attachment and above all the multiple and confusing claims associated with ‘belief’. In the North Atlantic this has to do notably, but not exclusively, with the prominence and legitimacy of conversion-led religious movements (including movements of renewal and revival) and with mass migration from outside Europe, from majority-Muslim countries and from former African and Caribbean colonies where evangelical Christianity has found a fertile terrain.

Just as certain ideas about religion’s place in modern culture were for long deeply embedded and little questioned, so we find, if we care to dig down, that certain concepts of the religious and the secular are embedded in the inherited ideas and practices of citizenship of perhaps most countries – ideas and practices which are so deeply implanted that they could almost be described as part of a collective subconscious. They were enshrined in Europe when the great religious conflicts which shaped the continent’s modern history fizzled out or were forced to an end. But the concept of the religious which they have institutionalized is peculiar to Europe and far from universal, as Talal Asad has affirmed in a much quoted phrase: ‘there cannot be a universal definition of religion, not only because it constituent elements and relationships are historically specific, but because that definition is itself the historical product of discursive processes’ (Asad 1993: 23). Asad’s more specific argument in the chapter relates to the tension between modern concepts of religions (plural) as truth-claiming cosmologies and of
religion (singular) in its multiple forms as a single phenomenon present in all societies and cultures: since religions make extremely ambitious claims, are we not trifling with them if we follow the injunction to tolerate them all? On the other hand, this implies, if religions consist of practices and ways of life with just some cosmological or doctrinal decoration, then why should they deserve special status as compared with clubs, debating societies, or charitable bodies? In a pronouncement covering many centuries Asad harks back to a model of medieval times in Europe when the authority of the Church was pre-eminent in all spheres of social life, and then describes the subsequent gradual ceding of control over secular spaces (described as such by the Church itself) as follows:

‘Discipline (intellectual and social) would… gradually abandon religious space, letting “belief”, “conscience” and sensibility” take its place”; ‘the weight of religion’ was shifted ‘more and more onto the moods and motivations of the individual believer’ (ibid. p.33);

Once upon a time, he is saying, religion defined the world and all the inhabitants of a society had to do was learn how it worked; in modernity, even As religion retreats to its own sphere, its followers are placed under pressure to take very seriously its cosmological claims – to become ‘true believers’.

Asad and others exaggerate: the religiosity of automatic or routine everyday observance and of popular religion - is alive and well in modern societies as evidenced by the pervasive presence of evangelical Christianity, of pilgrimages and of Jewish and Muslim observance. But their point is also important and even troubling, for it cannot be denied that modern societies in Europe in particular (much more than in the Americas) have great difficulty in dealing with the recognition of religion as belief and choice on the one hand, and the recognition of religion as an abstract category on the other, against a background of a deeply rooted Christian heritage. (As French politicians say: their state and their country are ‘laïc et de tradition judéo-chrétienne’.) The purpose of this paper is to unravel the resulting intellectual and practical dilemmas first by demonstrating the extreme difficulty if not impossibility of applying a consistent concept of religion in the management of state-religion relations and then by showing how comparison with other parts of the world casts doubt, most unfortunately, on the universalizing pretensions of our cherished European concept of religion and the secular.
In France the development of religious and secular spheres under the regime of laïcité has definite landmarks: the ‘Loi Ferry’ of 1882 which established the ‘free, secular and compulsory’ principle of schooling, the law of 1904 which removed clergy from the ranks of teachers in state schools, and finally the Law of 1905 on the separation of Church and State. Under this law the state ceased for ever, in laïcité’s classic formula (Saunders 2009), to ‘recognize, pay the salaries of, or subsidize’ any religious institution (‘culte’). At the same time the national state became the owner of then-existing cathedrals, and the local authorities, the communes, took nominal ownership of the parish churches, thus accepting responsibility for their upkeep (subject to budgetary constraints). In 2004, after years of controversy and periodic high-profile incidents, laïcité received further legislative attention in the form of the ‘headscarf ban’, which for the sake of precision, is not exactly a ban and is not applied only to headscarves. This illustrates the embedded and unenunciated meanings or associations which the word ‘religion’ entails, because some would recognize the headscarf not even as a religious ornament, but rather as a feature of a culture or maybe of a particular variety if Islamic observance – a distinction which is almost impossible to sustain consistently. Non-Muslim commentators reveal their own concept of religion when they ask to see ‘chapter-and-verse’ in the Koran to be convinced, a question which, apart from being somewhat offensive, betrays ethnocentrism and an ignorance of how norms evolve and take hold in any religion: it is common in Western secular societies (as Asad says) to think of religion as a set of codified beliefs and rules rather than as a heritage or set of practices which have taken root and evolved over decades and centuries in particular milieux. The question is no less offensive than one which would ask of an Englishman on what basis

1 ‘La République ne reconnaît, ne salarie ni ne subventionne aucun culte.’
the Christian Archbishop of Canterbury crowns the Monarch when in the Bible it is only in the Old Testament that one reads of kings being crowned by priests.

In England, in contrast to France, the state-religion relationship has evolved in a less clear-cut way through a myriad of concessions and negotiations, to the point where although there is what is quaintly called an ‘established’ – i.e. official – church, and although 26 Archbishops and Bishops sit as of right in the House of Lords, and the state pays for innumerable Church of England, Catholic, Jewish and Muslim schools\(^2\), constitutional practice is highly secularized, with zero government funding of religious buildings, worship or personnel, let alone of the training of that personnel – in contrast to the prevailing arrangements in many Northern European countries and some Swiss cantons. This was recently exemplified when in 2008 the government refused to continue its financial support for certain adoption agencies, linked, albeit sometimes tenuously, to the Catholic Church, unless, in accordance with the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of sexual preference, they agreed to consider same-sex couples wishing to adopt.

Thus citizenship is affected by the pattern of relations between state and religion – or ‘regime of religious regulation’, especially in the education system in Western countries: the regime will affect the direct and indirect costs to be born by parents who want their children’s education to include religious elements – or indeed by those wish their education to be free of such intromission. This last is not fanciful: the mobilization against cults in France led to the passing of the much publicized but relatively toothless \textit{loi anti-sectes} in 2001 (Altglas 2010).

These arrangements raise the question whether religious regulation does not produce perverse asymmetries or inconsistencies, whether respect for religious variations should take precedence over other policies, for example to reduce inequalities, to protect children’s rights, or indeed to protect parents’ rights (as in anti-cult controversies) and what it is precisely that is being respected when we speak of respect for religious

\footnote{\text{The Church of England website states that there are 4,800 CofE state-funded schools and the Catholic Education Service says it has 2,000. Numbers are not easily available for state-funded Jewish or Muslim schools.}}
variation, or difference, or just observance. Different religions and different aspects of them, are viewed as controversial or indeed uncontroversial at different times by different categories of people; such attitudes can change quite suddenly, and do not necessarily chime with advocates’ views about the correctness or even desirability of religious belief. Thus atheists may take the view that religious heritage is worthy of preservation, for aesthetic reasons or to transmit a sense of history to future generations, and feminists, whatever their own religious commitments, may defend Muslim women’s adoption of the headscarf as a sign of liberation or maybe an instrument of self-defence. The Northern Ireland political settlement which enshrines the Catholic and Protestant identity of institutions in the state apparatus may appear to be a flagrant violation of the separation of religion and state – but it is really a type of multicultural arrangement, in which the words Protestant and Catholic carry national and communal, rather than religious, connotations. Although the UK state funds denominational (‘Voluntary-Aided’) schools, it does not pay the churches themselves any particular attention or respect, nor does it pay the salaries of their clergy. Furthermore, those schools are expected not to engage in religious advocacy, and indeed where they do so the religious part of their teaching is not funded by the state but by parents or donations. Jewish schools are happy with this arrangement, while the situation in state-funded Muslim schools remains little researched. (Even then, there have been internal rows in the community about on account of ultra-Orthodox Rabbis who come to ‘reconvert’ the pupils in some Jewish schools.) In this context the status of the different religious traditions is apparently differentiated, though the difference would never be registered officially: the Church of England and Catholic Schools – which in some areas are full of Muslim pupils – are trusted to operate in a non-sectarian way and not to impose the belief systems of their sponsors, the Jewish schools have an apparently transparent arrangement on this score, but the fear among policymakers has been that Muslim schools would not fit into these conventions.

Citizenship is meant to be a category susceptible of dispassionate deployment, a bundle of difference-blind rights and obligations, spelt out in principles which can be applied by experts and judges without reference to comprehensive doctrines, as Rawls terms overarching philosophies based on non-negotiable assumptions (Rawls 1999). But dispassionate deployment means consistency of meaning, and these examples merely
serve to illustrate the extreme difficulty of incorporating the category ‘religion’ into a consistent set of norms or principles. Instead, there is convention – not overlapping consensus but unspoken conventions which evolve and change. Despite laws, symbols and practices which were designed to put an end to religious friction while opening a space for religion in general, particular religious traditions, or a particular version of those traditions, have been embedded in public life, for example a particular Christianity (Catholic, Anglican, Lutheran etc.), Islam (Sunni or Shia) or Judaism (in Israel) which attract both support or hostility, but which also seem inoffensive or even trivial to those who, though having little religious commitment, nonetheless value a shared religious heritage, or simply have been influenced by the environment in which they grew up. Precisely because the practices and symbols are embedded and unspoken, taken-for-granted, they may arouse a sense of grievance and exclusion among outsiders. Among the most deeply embedded are the religious feasts which have become entrenched in the secular calendar, like Christmas, even while vast numbers of people are apparently not even aware of the religious origins of Christmas. These are not mere matters of decoration: third and fourth generation Muslims (no longer immigrants expected to adapt) might well feel unrecognized in the calendar while, for their part, Christians who feel religion is a serious matter may rail against the trivialization and secularization of their great religious occasions. Such biases are by no means lacking in significance, as illustrated by the innumerable purportedly technical obstacles that planning authorities place in the face of those wishing to build mosques in France and in England, or when the authorities in England appear to resist subsidizing Muslim schools on the same basis as they subsidize those sponsored by Christian and Jewish institutions. And they are matters of concern also in the symbolic sphere: Europe’s religious history weighs heavily in the urban space, for example, in styles of architecture, in language itself. The Swiss referendum of November 2009, when a majority of those voting supported the proposal to ban the construction of minarets, brought unspoken fears to the fore: voters had not even dared to tell pollsters anonymously what they really thought. As a result of the vote, Article 72 of the Swiss Federal Constitution now contains a ban in the building of minarets (‘La construction de minarets est interdite’). So much for the abstract,
impersonal, difference-blind concept of the rights-bearing citizen. (We await a court case in which judges are called upon to distinguish between a minaret and a church spire.)

A fascinating vignette highlighting the confusions which arise in the context of affiliation and authority is provided by James Beckford and Sophie Gilliatt in their description of religious provision in English prisons, which involves official recognition of the primacy of the Church of England and an official salaried, full-time 1997 chaplaincy (480-strong in 1997) (Beckford and Gilliatt 1998: 34) staffed by ordained Church of England Ministers together with a sprinkling of Catholic and Methodist priests and pastors, as stipulated by the 1952 Prison Act. The chaplains are fully incorporated into the governing apparatuses both of the Prisons Service and (if they are Anglicans) the Church of England. Being a Prison Service and not a table tennis club rules of course are rules, and classifications and registrations are fixed and firm. So the prison bureaucracy takes the religious registrations – mandatory for every prisoner, though presumably they are able to declare themselves of no religion – very seriously, but of course classification is also an instrument of control, especially in the context of a prison. The authors (p. 40) describe how a volunteer Church of England officiant (a ‘Lay Reader’ in the Church’s parlance) who was a daily visitor and a member of the chaplaincy, tried to ‘create opportunities for sharing “common ground” between prisoners of different faith traditions’, and was thwarted ‘by prison officers’ refusal to allow Muslims to attend meetings of Christians’ (p. 40-41). A similar pattern is seen in the observation by Beckford and others in the separate study of Muslims in Prisons (Beckford, Joly et al. 2005: 109) that in some prisons (not all) the officers would police observance of the Ramadan fast: if they caught prisoners eating during the day they would ‘take them off’ the list of observant Muslims. In other words, in these places religious observance was seen as a type of privilege, even if it involved fasting. The prison is a particular type of context, obviously, but the observation does illustrate the potential for moral twisting when the state gets involved in managing the boundaries of religion.
But in recent decades, the UK Prison Service has had to appoint ‘Visiting Ministers’ – i.e. non-Christian religious personnel, who receive fees and travel costs. The Prison Chaplain acts as intermediary in detecting needs and finding people who would do the job of a Visiting Minister, and the authors’ survey showed that almost all chaplains saw the promotion of religion in general, or at least of respect for religion, as part of their job, hinting fairly strongly that Church of England Ministers probably do this better than a secular and thus religiously neutral, official, and also that those Ministers tend to be quite diffident about promoting Christianity: they also think of themselves as social workers and are ‘religiously secular’.

The twists and turns continue: it is very difficult to find a woman who can provide for Muslim prisoners because Muslim authorities do not recognize them, while Imams have hesitations in visiting the women’s section of a prison. In one women’s section Beckford and Gilliat found women who wanted to convert to Islam and so demanded a male Imam to support their efforts. (Beckford and Gilliat 1998: 92)(p.92). In addition there are budgetary constraints: prisons can be located deep in the countryside while most Muslim populations and their officiants are located in urban centres, so they are likely to be more expensive, placing pressure on the Senior Chaplain or Governor’s budget. The authors also allude to ‘alien and threatening’ pressures on Muslim Visiting Ministers by non-Muslims prisoners (p. 92).

Two aspects of this vignette from the prison world should interest a discussion of secularism: one, as we have seen, is the persistence of an undertow of Christian heritage in states which are clearly secular because they have unwound their ties to a Church, and the other is the recognition that individuals are entitled to change their religious affiliation for reasons exclusive to themselves. States which accorded freedoms and exemptions to religions in general, assuming that meant only one or two European creeds, now find themselves confronted by demands from multiple religious traditions, including varieties of Christianity and Judaism, whose spokespeople do not always share the state’s assumptions.
From tolerance to recognition

Jews have suffered discrimination in most European countries, but they have tended, broadly speaking, to draw on their own resources to build their institutions (at least until they had a state of their own which lavishes patronage on religious institutions), and although they have obviously railed against direct discrimination, have not usually expressed a sense of exclusion on grounds of state favouritism of non-Jews. The same can be said of dissident or non-conformist Protestant sects. The plea for tolerance in modern Europe was not a plea for recognition (Lukes 1997), as the French 1905 Law and 1958 Constitution explicitly state, but later the terrain began to shift to competition for resources, notably state subsidization of religious education, and through initiatives aimed at defusing dangerous social and political flashpoints (legislating against ‘hate speech’, the UK’s ‘Combating Extremism Together’ programme, launched in 2007 to explain to British Muslims ‘what it means to be a Muslim in Britain today’). This is not surprising: Christian tradition in Europe receives ample recognition embedded in institutions, in the fabric of urban life, in language. The tolerance regime caters well to dominant traditions and their offshoots, the public-private separation protects their social/cultural dominance by keeping new arrivals in the private sphere. So the tolerance/recognition distinction also seems shaky.

This becomes an explicit theme in Tariq Modood’s plea for a secular multiculturalism or multicultural secularism, as distinct from the kind of secularism which would consign religion – but not, as he is eager to point out, sexuality – to the private sphere. Modood does not comment on specifics like the subsidization of Muslim schools, or the representation of Muslims in specific public bodies, or the recognition of sharia courts on the model of Jewish courts, but he does say that if Britain is to be judged an ‘egalitarian, inclusive, multicultural society’, ‘Muslims should be treated as a legitimate group in their own right’ and that their presence in British society ‘has to be explicitly reflected in all walks of life and in all institutions’ (Modood 2009: 172-173). The thrust of an argument is surely not just that Muslims should be free to practise their religion or that institutions should be open to them as individuals, or even that they should receive
affirmative action-style support to promote their participation in institutional life, but rather that they should have permanent group rights and that the state should fund the visibility of Islam in the public sphere. It may seem outlandish at first sight, but in the light of the impossibility in the UK, and probably throughout Europe, of finding a pyramidal, coherent set of secular arrangements, it is hard to dismiss, and may be defensible on various grounds, such as social engineering (encouraging religious tolerance or non-aggression) or even some sort of justice grounded in a still-to-be-argued principle of equal recognition of religious traditions. Unsurprisingly, then, Muslim voices have not been vociferously raised against the establishment of the Church of England, for it sets a sort of useful precedent in that it embodies state recognition. In the USA this would be unthinkable: such is United States hostility to involvement of the state in religious life and vice versa, that even the timid initiative to involve faith groups in social policy under George Bush came to nothing.

In Europe the varied involvements of the state in managing religion in the public square under the umbrella of a state which protests its secular character, have coincided with a politicization of religious expression and shrill debates about the rights of religions as institutions (which were the subjects of the 1905 Law in France for example) and the rights of individuals (who did not figure in that Law at all) (Saunders 2009). Indeed, very thorny problems arise in connection with the legitimacy of particular and sometimes competing religious authorities in their attempt to determine who counts as a member of a religion and what counts as a fulfilment of a religion’s precepts. Such issues might not matter if religion remained a ‘purely private’ affair; but it is not, and as claims for recognition and for resources develop so these competing claims intensify. For in another sense religion is an eminently private, or at least individual, matter, since it is now universally agreed in Western Europe, in the Americas and in Sub-Saharan Africa that individuals are entitled to opt for and change their religious affiliation irrespective of their family background. We have seen the unfolding of the implications of this individualistic, even self-indulgent, interpretation of the rights of the religious in the French disputes surrounding the ‘Headscarf Law’ of 2004, and the recent dispute in
England around the admissions policies of London’s Jewish Free School (UK Supreme Court, December 1909). (In legal matters one speaks of England with reason, because Scotland has its own civil law system, and Northern Ireland is another story, as mentioned above.)

The other big but related trend, which is recognizable globally, is towards religious conversion, by which is meant both changing religious affiliation from one or ‘none’ to another but also, and equally importantly, the adoption of strict observance by people who have been brought up in a secular environment with a soft or purely formal affiliation to the religion of their family. The success of conversion-led movements—which exist in all the great religious traditions—challenges the idea of religion as heritage, as ‘imbibed with mother’s milk’, and thus also the hidden assumption that others can recognize a person’s religious affiliation through external markers: the criterion described above as ‘objective’. It is not acceptable in contemporary polite society (in Western Europe), or in a courtroom or classroom, to prejudge a person’s religious affiliation by their name or their physiognomy, unless of course they are wearing a uniform—a headscarf, a wig, a particular style of beard etc. But even these outward signs no longer form part of a package of markers: the man in a black suit and black hat might have been born into a non-Jewish family, and the woman in a headscarf into a non-Muslim family, both may have converted in adulthood, and so on. A person may claim recognition on grounds of religious belief, whatever their family background and whatever the authority they claim for that belief, even though those beliefs could change in a few weeks or months. Millions of people have converted to Pentecostalism (Lehmann 1996; Martin 2001; Maxwell 2006) in particular, and hundreds of thousands of Muslims have ‘reconverted’ through Tablighi Jama’at for example (Metcalf 1996), just as tens of thousands of Jews from non-observant backgrounds have adopted an ultra-Orthodox life by following the Lubavitch or a similar sect (Aviad 1983; Lehmann and Siebzehner 2006; Heilman and Friedman 2010).
It is high time that philosophers of the secular thought through the implications of this phenomenon, especially since there are grounds for asking ourselves whether conversion-led movements – despite the illiberal tendencies of their spokespersons – are not also more compatible at least with a liberal philosophy of the secular than the ‘old-style’ identity in which religious affiliation came in a package of kinship, community, territory, and ritual life. From a liberal point of view religion is a commitment to a doctrine, a comprehensive doctrine in Rawls’ terms – not easily debated between rational individuals and thus excluded from public reason (see below). These are doctrines nevertheless, not primordial communitarian commitments, and in the language of the one comprehensive defence of the suitability and indeed the necessity of doctrinally-based religion in modern society, that of Charles Taylor, they are embodied in transcendent belief systems. In what Taylor (Taylor 2007) calls the immanent frame, in contrast, ‘the structures we live: scientific, social, technological… are part of a “natural” or “this-worldly” order which can be understood in its own terms without reference to the “supernatural” or “transcendent” – a formulation which might be regarded as a banal reiteration of basic notions first enunciated by sociology’s founding fathers. In his chapter ‘Cross Pressures’ Taylor offers several ways in which the buffered self, the modern self, which is driven by its inner rationality and emotions and is sheltered (‘buffered’, and endowed with ‘spiritual self-possession’ – p. 563) from compelling, uncontestable obligations to others and to the divine, succumbs to belief because the materialist story, the science-is-all story, does not provide sufficient reason to believe the ‘God is dead’ story, or the ‘subtraction story’ as he describes it frequently in this chapter. (By ‘subtraction’ he means the idea that merely disproving the basis for believing in God’s existence is taken to be sufficient to sustain the great ideals of modern humanism – universal welfare, freedom, justice.) Likewise, he does not see how the ‘wildly and implausibly reductive’ claims of Freud, and nowadays by implication of cognitive and evolutionary psychologists, that religion is a perennial human motivation, gives grounds for rejection of religion (pp. 573-4). He enumerates various ways in which the immanent frame can be drawn to the transcendent, but the easy examples do not satisfy him: irreligious people (in German and in Quebec) who still want their children to have a religious education (p.598) because of the moral benefits they believe or hope it will bring may tell us
something about their needs, but their reasons do not help; and merely observing ‘that there must be some way in which this life looks good, whole, proper, really being lived as it should’ (what he calls ‘fullness’) (p. 600) is not an argument for Christian belief, since the immanent frame can also offer ‘its own versions’ (ibid.) . A crucial point is that ‘the notion that there is something higher, more important than mutual benefit’ does not threaten ‘what is good in the Enlightenment package’ (p.579). But the Enlightenment package is not just one: there is a passionate pursuit of a fusion of reason and feeling in an ultimate beauty transcending the limits of reason (associated with Schiller and Goethe), and there is a demand for wholeness (which he associates with a radical Enlightenment figures like Helvétius) ‘finding a way to render all sensual ordinary desires compatible with one another both within and between human agents’ – shades here, of course, of what would become the contrast between German Romanticism and French reason.

If Pentecostals, whose religiosity is widely described as very much a product and promoter of modernity and a beneficiary of the secularization of the public sphere (Martin 1990), do not invoke the transcendental in the sense in which Taylor understands the word, they do, in contrast, invoke and mobilize the supernatural. Taylor however defines religion in terms of transcendence, not the supernatural. It involves belief ‘in some agency or power transcending the immanent order’ (p. 20) but above all ‘the sense that there is some good higher than, beyond human flourishing’. In the Christian case this is the love which God has for us, and which we can partake of through his power… a possibility of transformation… which takes us beyond merely human perfection’. (He obviously allows there are non-Christian cases but the book is dominated by this, deeply Christian, conception.) This definition, which is later extended at length, is almost an epiphany (one of many), and seems to me to have little in common with the Pentecostalism and other religious movements which are sweeping the world now.

Taylor’s text is long-winded, leisurely, full of digressions and of oracular invocations of a single zeitgeist-bearer known as ‘we’. This ‘we’ is a product not of any research but largely of Taylor’s own impressions of the society around him, for although he invokes sociological texts he does not mobilize or analyze their content. This would make a
difference because it would show that his search for a weakness in the immanent frame which opens the way to belief in God is paralleled by a characteristic of modern concepts of the supernatural whereby religion itself mobilizes a scientific style of reasoning, to varying effect. I refer to the practice of certifying miracles, notably at Lourdes (Harris 1999), to the endlessly reiterated claims by Pentecostal preachers that doctors have certified the healings which they have witnessed, and indeed to the innumerable other practical benefits which Pentecostals claim flows from the expansion of their flock, both to society and to their followers. A perusal of the work of Patricia Birman, André Corten, Andrew Chesnut and myself in Brazil, of David Maxwell in Southern Africa, of Birgit Meyer in Ghana (whom Taylor does cite), of Ruth Marshall in Nigeria (Meyer 1995; Lehmann 1996; Birman 1997; Chesnut 1997; Birman 1998; Meyer 1998; Corten 1999; Birman 2001; Lehmann 2001; Maxwell 2006), among many others, would demonstrate the singularly modern combination of the invocation of the supernatural and the immediacy of the purposes for which it is mobilized which has little in common with the transcendent frame yet is, for want of a better, thoroughly religious. In my field research in Brazil in the 1990s, I found that it was standard for Pentecostals to claim that Catholic countries are poorer than Protestant ones. They involved their rituals in the daily lives and problems of their followers: they arranged solutions to sentimental problems, to financial problems, to community problems such as drug trafficking and related violence, always through a ritual procedure. Their references to the transcendent, to the afterlife, were few, and in the burgeoning neo-Pentecostal churches which are spreading across the globe they are even fewer (Marshall 2009). Other research also confirms that theology is reduced to a few summary formulae and replaced by moral exhortation and homilies, accompanied by real-life histories (Campos 1997). Readings from the Bible consist of gobbets which serve as a springboard for often dramatic uplifting elaborations. Heaven and indeed hell are here on earth, and the Churches offer a cure for these. All the literature, from David Martin onwards (Martin 1990; Martin 2001), concurs in the quintessential modernity of Pentecostalism, and it has spread across the Protestant-Catholic divide and possibly the Christian-Jewish divide to infuse those traditions as well (Martin 1990; Martin 2001; Chesnut 2003; Lehmann 2003; Lehmann and Siebzehner 2006). Apart from Pentecostal styles, there is also at least in the USA an apparently
widespread notionally Christian religiosity of wellbeing in which the divine is an entirely personal presence in people’s lives – ‘Jesus is my buddy’ (Luhrmann 2004). Bryan Turner, in this collection, speaks of a ‘post-institutional, subjective and privatised spirituality’ converging in a consumer society with passive citizenship, and there is of course a widespread recognition (the ‘religious economy’ or rational choice school of the sociology of religion) that religious organizations adopt entrepreneurial and corporate strategies to gain members and power. But one might go further and ask whether market relations have become constitutive of some of the most dynamic forms of ‘religion’, rendering the term almost unrecognisable.

The Pentecostal movement poses two problems for Taylor’s schema: it is a religious revival but one which does not evoke the transcendent, or does so only marginally; it adopts a quasi-scientific language to certify its miracles. For secularists it poses a problem because of the centrality of conversion to Pentecostalism’s very existence. This is a religious movement which, like capitalism, seems to have to grow to survive. It is a global movement from below which straddles cultural and political boundaries to the point where Jean Comaroff has described one of its leading expressions, the Brazil-based Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, as an attempt to create a world theocracy (Comaroff 2009). That may be an exaggeration. On the whole, Pentecostals have not posed serious problems for regimes of religious regulation: their involvement in politics is largely of a corporatist kind, seeking office and resources, and they do not adopt the kind of political-religious rhetoric that is heard in the United States, associated less with the strictly Pentecostal stream than with fundamentalist Christianity3 (Freston 2001; Comaroff 2009).

3 There is a terminological confusion here. In the US there is a clear divide between Pentecostals and Evangelicals. The latter tend to emphasize textual inerrancy and keep a distance from the practices associated with Pentecostalism such as speaking in tongues, exorcism and healing, and it is the fundamentalist stream which is more politicized. The Gospel of Heath and Wealth, which has caught on in Africa on a massive scale and is also influential in certain Latin American neo-Pentecostal churches (like the Brazil-based but now global, Universal Church of the Kingdom of God) is associated with Pentecostalism. Elsewhere, in contrast, except in England, where evangelicals tend to the fundamentalist stream also, the word evangelical is almost synonymous with Pentecosal.
Maxwell 2006; Fonseca 2008; Gifford 2009). Indeed, given their claims that they are changing society by exorcising, literally and metaphorically, violence and corruption – as one hears so often in Brazilian churches – one might wish that their involvement in politics was more ideological, or at least more cause-oriented.

This is not only because Pentecostal preaching and ritual is, as has been said, so heavily oriented to this-worldly goods and problems, but also because of its engagement with religious forms which are simply off the Taylor radar. With an emotional intensity ranging from shrillness to discretion, Pentecostalism plugs in to African indigenous and Brazilian ideas about possession and exorcism. The Brazilian variety are known as *cultos Afro* or Afro-Brazilian cults even though they are the product of centuries of autonomous existence in Brazil. The common theme in Pentecostalism is the diabolic harm which the possession cults can do and the power of Pentecostal preachers and rituals to resist and extirpate that harm and the agents which mediate it. In many churches and chapels the reference is discrete while in some – most notoriously the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God – it is proclaimed as a leading theme, above and beyond themes of salvation, which in any case refer to this-worldly solutions. The this-worldly dimension requires emphasis because the Pentecostal phenomenon is a fast-moving object which seems to keep well ahead of academic observers. The neo-Pentecostalism which was becoming visible in the 1990s now seems to be almost the dominant form of Pentecostal expansion, distinguished by the very large size and global reach of its churches, the ever-increasing emphasis on self-realization and the social advancement of its followers in Latin America and Africa, a more or less total disinterest in doctrine and declining emphasis on the ‘life hereafter’, be it the delights of paradise or the sufferings of hell – themes so prominent in traditional Pentecostalism (Marshall 2009; Lehmann 2011).

If the notion of transcendence does not fit Pentecostal movements, then surely its applicability in modern societies must be questioned. Furthermore many habits and practices which have developed in Pentecostalism have been adopted by movements in other churches, notably the Catholic Charismatic Renewal, which once aroused much suspicion on the part of bishops but has been at the forefront of Catholicism’s reviving fortunes in Latin America (Chesnut 2003; Lehmann 2003). Pentecostalism also embodies
the idea of religion as a personal choice: its followers, much more than half of whom are women\(^4\), affiliate independently of family history or locality, and indeed it may be important to them to do so if they are seeking in the church a refuge or a solution to problems of family violence or sorcery (Meyer 1995; Lehmann 1996; Meyer 1998).

Other conversion-led movements obviously have significant differences vis-à-vis Pentecostalism but share with it a this-worldly orientation and what has been called a greedy characteristic as they invade the personal lives of followers. The ultra-Orthodox Jewish revival is also only secondarily concerned with the transcendent. Its main emphasis, stated by any of its emissaries with whom one speaks, is on bringing secularized Jews ‘back’ to a strictly observant Jewish way of life. There are velleities of New Age spirituality in the Chabad or Lubavitch movement, some of whose followers believe that the Chabad leader (universally known as ‘the Rebbe’ d. 1994) remains alive, and visit his tomb in New York to commune with him, and they engage in a certain amount of quasi-mystical singing and dancing, but the transcendent is a secondary concern, confined to the study of Kabbalah which itself is treated with some gingerliness and reserved only for mature men.\(^5\)

These short examples are intended to raise the question whether the immanent frame is so much in contradiction with religion, as Taylor endlessly asserts. Maybe religion itself has changed in Europe and North America, or maybe these religious forms have a long history but have found in contemporary modernity a particularly fertile terrain. Either way, the contrast between conversion-led movements and Taylor’s concept of religion is

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\(^4\) The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life published a 10-country survey of Pentecostals in 2006 which stated that the gender representation among ‘renewalists’ was not biased towards women, but its tables show very clearly that among Pentecostals in all ten countries (the US plus three countries each in Africa, Asia and Latin America) women predominate, sometimes heavily. (p. 38). The Report can be found at the Forum’s website.

\(^5\) The Kabbalah Centres, led by the self-styled Rabbi Berg, are of course another matter and do not claim to be Jewish.
a pointer to the difficulty which contemporary states sometimes have in managing religion. In contemporary Europe, whose regime of religious regulation is rooted in centuries of hegemonic Catholicism or Protestantism, enshrining in the background assumptions of public life the notion of religion as heritage, it has a revolutionary character, as it does in Latin America: individuals, not institutions, become the bearers of religious rights and exemptions, and try to claim recognition simply by stating ‘I believe….’. It has not brought serious problems in Latin America, where small constitutional changes since the 1980s have accommodated the loss of the remaining privileged institutional prerogatives which the Catholic Church had managed to retain, but in Europe it has destabilized the regime of regulation – i.e. secularism.

One source of new questions for secularist arrangements is the combination of the trend towards religion as a choice, in the wake of movements of conversion and reconversion, and the influx within a few generations of immigrants from predominantly Muslim ex-colonies such as Pakistan and Bangladesh in Britain and Algeria and other North African countries in France. The emergence of a European Islam – or many variants of Islam in Europe - disembedded from its home territory has also provided a favourable terrain, it seems, for the reconversion phenomenon. Jocelyne Cesari describes two sorts of ‘New Muslims’ in Europe: on one hand a ‘secularized bond with Islam that relativizes its needs and requirements’, and on the other ‘a fundamentalist attitude that demands respect for Islamic tradition in its totality’ (Cesari 2007: 114). In both models there is a strong element of detachment from ethnic affiliations, and from ‘official’ or ‘parish’ leaders who promote a variety of worship and observance transplanted from the country of origin. These sources of authority are replaced in some sectors of the immigrant population by personal study and decision in a context in which extended kinship networks are being eroded and roots in countries of origin become ever more generationally remote – though there are countertendencies as well (Shaw 2001).6 The

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6 It should however be noted that, according to Shaw’s research, in the UK there is a significant propensity among Pakistani and Bangladeshi second and third generation to bring spouses, make and female, from the countries of origin in order to comply with the obligations of kinship or to protect against the harmful influences of the permissive society Shaw, A. (2001). "Kinship, Cultural Preference and Immigration:
upshot is yet another example where modernity may stimulate fundamentalism, because people educated in the West, disembedded from the kinship and community networks which uphold the above-mentioned authorities, study basic texts for themselves and make do without the heritage of transmitted and packaged versions which have prevailed in different locations across the globe. (A similar trend is observable in Judaism, in the proliferation of independent Rabbinical figures, especially promoting messianic versions of Jewish nationalism in Israel, but also in multiple versions of non-traditional or anti-traditional ritual and observance.)

Olivier Roy, preoccupied above all by Islamist politics, in a book with the polemical title ‘La Sainte Ignorance’ (Roy 2008), expresses an anxiety about these developments which may have roots in his very European conception of religion as a heritage embodied in great institutions and a tradition of learning: the followers of Islamist movements and indeed their preachers have often not received any formal training at all, and above all have not been socialized into an established culture of learning and institutional life, something they share with Pentecostals. Their choice and interpretation of religious texts is not shaped by an institutional tradition, and reportedly they are often in conflict with Mosque committees, whose members may be culturally and even linguistically out of touch with the young (Lewis 2007). The movements’ politicization of religion – in the sense of mobilizing religious motivations for political demands and grievances in the national and international arenas - also testifies to their this-worldly orientation, though this dimension also carries an element of sloganizing. Yunas Samad describes a younger generation in the North of England who speak the Pakistani national or regional languages of their parents only as a second language, and shift their identification away from ‘Mirpuri or other regional identification’ towards ‘Muslim identification’. This generation is divided into a minority middle class elite which takes the religion seriously, studies texts and leans towards rigid – though not tradition-based – interpretations (practices which Samad describes as ‘fundamentalist’ while taking care to put the word in

quotes) and a larger, much more socially marginal working class who adopt and deploy a kaleidoscopic Islam in which rap music and other elements of popular culture are intermingled with almost random political allusions (‘Hamas rule OK, ‘Voting is Kufr’7) proclaiming their marginality and exclusion. (Samad 2007: 163)

Islamist movements may be noisy and occasionally violent, but their followers are a tiny minority compared, say, with the Tablighi Jama’at, a worldwide pietist movement which, like Chabad, draws Muslims back to a dedication to their faith, but in a version which seems quite different from the Islam practised in the context of immigrant-dominated neighbourhoods in Europe. Tablighi is also disembedded from the particular traditions which most English mosques would follow; it has a global reach and it demands of followers that they devote a certain time each year to the movement, that they lead a pious life, and that they set an example to other Muslims by their exemplary behaviour, externalized by a distinctive dress code for men. Every year it organizes a vast pilgrimage in Pakistan attended by people from all over the world, whose pilgrimage is also an exercise in evangelization. A rare ethnography describes the activities of the Tablighi in an ‘unlikely’ area on the east coast of Southern of Thailand as follows: ‘Emphasis is given to the lifestyle regime, to prayer, and to the transformation of worldly pursuits to religious concerns. Members submit themselves to the authority of the emir. While the worship of saints and shrines is condemned harshly as idolatry, the Tabligh use Sufi techniques of piety and spirituality to control the psyche and conduct of new recruits.’ (Horstmann 2009: 39) The article also describes the adoption of a distinctive dress code and the opening up of opportunities to join a worldwide Tablighi movement and travel to its many centres and pilgrimage sites, as well as undertaking the obligatory missionary work. All this represents, of course, a radical break with the existing inherited way of being a Muslim in this area.

Tablighi Jama’at is not offering much in the way of worldly goods, but it is offering a great deal in terms of worldly engagement. Like Pentecostals and Chabad, there is much

7 Seen on a large hoarding in the town of Luton during the 2002 election campaign.
pressure to join in evangelizing campaigns, to devote large amounts of time and money to the movement. These movements are greedy for their members’ commitment and time and maybe also their financial resources, as in Lewis Coser’s definition of greedy institutions which ‘seek exclusive and undivided loyalty’ and make ‘omnivorous’ demands on followers (Coser 1974). Transcendence seems to be a secondary matter, if it matters at all. In Chabad as in all ultra-Orthodox Judaism, the study of Rabbinic texts is the highest act of piety (mitzvah), but in contrast to the trend in other Jewish ultra-Orthodox sects and institutions, full-time study is discouraged after a person has been married two years, and the movement’s core cadre consists of emissaries who manage outposts and centres which are rather like mission stations the world over. In this Chabad stands in contrast to the devotion to full-time study which dominates other sectors of ultra-Orthodoxy (Friedman 1987).

We thus have a genre of conversion-led movement in Christianity, Judaism and Islam, for which expansion is a raison d’être, and which is characterized by its transnational reach, its this-worldly orientation, and recruitment and retention on the basis of individual loyalty rather than communal obligation. Some important features, though, are not common across the religious boundaries: the involvement with the devil, with themes and motifs and beliefs from possession cults which is central to Pentecostalism in Africa and Latin America, is quite marginal in conversion-led movements in Islam or Judaism; the predominance of a diasporic population as the main field of recruitment is variable, being most evident among European Muslims and Pentecostals, but absent in Africa and Latin America. The diaspora element is obviously present among European Jews but is not related to a recent experience of emigration and social exclusion.

Although the Pentecostal movements have changed the religious field by undermining the hegemony of historic Protestant churches and the Catholic Church in Africa and Latin America, these shifts in quantitative representation do not seem to have brought much disturbance to the state management of religion. Nevertheless, the state in Latin America has tended to withdraw ever more from institutional involvement in the religious field (in recognizing or subsidizing religions or giving them a voice at official occasions): in
Brazil it seems to be easier to set up a church than to set a bar; in Mexico constitutional constraints on the Catholic Church dating back to 1859 were lifted in 1992 opening the way for it to take a high profile role in public life. In Europe, by contrast, although there is strong growth of Pentecostalism among African and Caribbean migrants and their descendants (*issus de l’immigration* in French terminology) it is among Muslims that issues of religious exemption and prerogative arise quite frequently in education, in the public square, and in governments’ anxiety about security issues, linked to the trend to renewed piety, and the passage of an early period when, in England at least, the watchword was more assimilation and less the marking out of difference. Indeed, in 2011 the issue of Islam and how it fits in with laïcité has come to poison the political atmosphere threatening to tear apart the ruling UNP party.

The anxiety about identity and security has stimulated initiatives such as the government-led French national debate about national identity in 2009-10, with a further controversial event help by the UNP in April 2011, and the UK’s raft of legislation on subjects linked to terrorism but including, presumably as a kind of balancing exercise, the criminalization of ‘Incitement to Religious Hatred’ in 2007. In France a very official-looking Conseil Français du Culte Musulman which suffers from being staffed with official appointees and friends of the Algerian government and is regarded by an unknown number of French Muslims as unrepresentative, was established in 2003. In the UK various Muslim representative-cum-consultative bodies (notably the ‘Muslim Council of Britain) have been recognized and their members recognized or de-recognized in accordance with internal and external disputes. The Conseil is modeled on the Consistoire which has represented French Jews since Napoleon (Silvestri 2010). Nonetheless, its total independence does not prevent the Bureau des Cultes (a section of the Ministry of the Interior which registers ‘Associations a fins religieux’) from providing advisory services for the Council, including attendance at the meetings, to ensure that it conducts its affairs in a proper manner. The long British tradition of complex formal and informal links between Church and state (as witness the Prison Chaplaincy) has provided a backdrop to mutual engagement and conflict. Notably after 2001, and especially after the London bomb attacks of July 2007, the government inaugurated a programme called ‘Preventing
Extremism’ in the Department for Communities and Local Government, later renamed initially ‘Preventing Extremism Together’ and later just PREVENT, which lists among its activities ‘Improving theological understanding and putting in place long-term measures in place to support faith leaders and institutions’. The programme funds Muslim NGOs to go into schools and colleges, for example, with dramatic and didactic presentations designed to discourage young people from following jihadist calls.

There are then two reasons for claiming that in Europe we are so to speak ‘not in Kansas anymore’. In unpacking the idea of the secular José Casanova (Casanova 1994) separated three aspects: the loss of state control over religion and the end of religion’s involvement in the state, the decline of the practice of religion in society, and the differentiation process whereby religious institutions became more specialized and lost or renounced their direct prerogatives in spheres like the economy, family law, and education which were taken from outside the control of religious institutions. The thesis was a modification of classic secularization theory because it disputed the idea of the relegation of religion to a private sphere – hence the book’s title. Yet we are now bound to ask – is this the religion which once, in Europe, occupied not just a place in the public sphere but in the state? Stated another way: European regimes of religious regulation rest on a certain Christian conception of religion, with its institutions and its hierarchies. Those hierarchies have renounced most of their prerogatives, though their bishops and priests retain much respect in public opinion. In their place the most dynamic religions are conversion-led and this-worldly in outlook, and their followers tend to be driven by personal motivation, rather than by the bonds of community or kinship. Even if – as so often – their followers have been born into a religious culture or tradition, they have opted individually for particular versions of that tradition, which often have little to do with the versions in which they were brought up. Since these movements are young and

8 http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/prevent/overview/ourrole/

9 Based on an interview at the Cohesion and Faith Unit, Department for Communities and Local Government October 2006 and on observations at a meeting in which police, local government and Muslim organizations were represented, Slough, 2008.
lack any history of state recognition or engagement, they operate like any other pressure group, but with the slight advantage that they can take advantage of Europe’s history of religious prerogatives and exemptions in making claims for themselves and their followers. Governments, for their part, may be shifting towards a flexible posture vis-à-vis religion in which the heavy structures and conventions of the past, whether they are structures of concertation and cooperation (England) or of polite mutual disengagement (France) are not exactly dismantled, but are gradually massaged and adapted to new interests and purposes. In France the adaptation of laïcité to the new situations is proving very complicated: although the headscarf ban (in schools mainly) passed with little commotion, hostility to immigrants, and principally to Muslims, is coded in political controversies surround Islam and laïcité, with inflammatory comparisons of street prayer meetings to the Nazi Occupation.

**European Secularism as one of many variants in the state management of religion**

If Europe then is outgrowing the secular question, what of the rest of the world? To deal with this sort of question, that is with the peculiarly European concept of both religion and the secular which tend to dominate writing on state-religion relations, the Religion and Secularism Network held a series of workshops and seminars in 2007-9, and we reformulated secularism in a broad way so as to encompass a range of possibilities, recognizing that, with its assumptions of clear dividing lines and definitions of the religious and the secular and separate spheres of authority, Europe offers only one of many arrangements which seem compatible with modernity. State management of religion is a more all-encompassing term describing institutional arrangements, which allows us to spell out the variables which in their turn go to make up the relationship between state and religion, and leave secularism as one set of variants. Setting aside occasional cases where religion manages the state, this is to say (a) that all states manage

10 Funded by the UK’s Arts and Humanities Research Council and the Economic and Social Research Council under their joint Religion and Society programme.
religion in one way or another, and (b) that within that very large set secularism is a sub-
set and within secularism there are also further sub-sets. The notion that the state
manages religion does not necessarily denote a one-way traffic of authority or influence:
it is the state, not just the government, which manages, and religion may well have a
voice in the state, but the state sets down, sometimes more explicitly than others, the
ground rules, which are legal but also include, importantly, an undergrowth of
‘background culture’ (Rawls 1999). Rawls would like to exclude the background culture
from the realm of public reason, but much as his conception of a realm of political reason
in which comprehensive doctrines have no place (because they are too divisive), may
attract those in search of a quiet life, for a social scientist it is something of an entelechy.
He does however construct his model with immense care, invoking the overlapping
consensuses which form a background as providing the underpinning for the essentially
technical rules which govern public reason. This is different from invoking an
overarching set of values because the incompatibility of competing comprehensive
doctrines makes it impossible to establish those values for the purposes of public reason.
He also eventually envisages the introduction of comprehensive doctrines into public
reason so long as ‘in due course proper political reasons – and not reasons given solely by
comprehensive doctrines - are also presented’ (Rawls 1999: 152). Public reason itself is
circumscribed: it is not random reasoning in public, but that reasoning which is
undertaken by officials, judges, experts and even political parties. Taylor, in a paper
written several years before A Secular Age, (Taylor 1998: 49), recalls that Rawls
excludes comprehensive doctrines from the framing of rules of political engagement
because they are too divisive. He then considers Rawls’ idea of an overlapping
consensus, which is designed to find a common ground of some sort between many
religious philosophies, and notes that it is ‘adhered to for many different reasons’. The
formula involves distinguishing the ‘ethic converged on’ from the ‘underlying reasons’,
but as Taylor says ‘in different contexts this political ethic does not interpret itself’ and
‘the background of justification will vary enormously’. There are too many ‘canonical
modes of thought’. Under what he calls ‘the older models’ (of secularism) ‘authoritative
adjudication by experts… provides this assurance’, but no longer. In effect he is saying
that Rawls’ formula runs into an internal contradiction. So, as in his Report on the state of
Quebec (Taylor and Bouchard 2008) he falls back on ‘negotiated compromise: ‘we will have to live in a ‘kind of pale “ecumenicism” where each feels constrained from speaking about each other’s views’ (p. 51). To ask for the principle of fairness to provide a basis for rules is, he says, to ask ‘too much’: the advantage of overlapping consensus is that it does not provide any justification.

These debates seem to rest on a distinction between substance (ethic) and procedures (expertise, rules, fairness) which in Taylor’s view is impossible to disentangle from comprehensive doctrines and, maybe more importantly in today’s world, from holistic, or primordial ones. Taylor’s solution is a version of ‘muddling through’ – and even then the negotiations he wants us to rely on depend on rules and procedure. His solution is quite understandable, but maybe its radical empiricism or pragmatism is due to a desperate attempt to salvage European and Enlightenment reason in the face of the very unEuropean and not infrequently unenlightened social and political forces to which proposals such as his, and maybe Rawls’, are responding. Rawls would never have used such expressions, but Taylor comes close. Both go as far as they can within their theoretical frameworks, yet neither provides – or maybe even intends to provide - a guide to resolving the issues which currently arise between religions, between different versions of the same religious tradition, and between the state and religion, and above all between definitions of religion. That is Martha Nussbaum’s worry: that the exclusion of comprehensive doctrines excludes too much that is of real concern to reasonable people though she recognizes that in the 1999 essay ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ Rawls does extend the range of what s acceptable political speech in the way quoted here. But then others, whom she quotes, criticize Rawls for going too far in making what is in effect a concession.

So perhaps there is some merit in shifting the terms of the discussion: in elevating religion and doctrine to such a privileged place in the discussion of secularism, and in positing philosophical principles as guides to action, one undoubtedly and indispensably
helps to clarify assumptions and concepts, but one also risks taking too Olympian a view of the messy arrangements which operate in state structures and the rough-and-tumble of political debate, and one also risks bypassing the real life of religion which is not much concerned with comprehensive doctrines at all Yet bringing or admitting religious doctrines into public reason may render an important service, because if it is done sufficiently widely and frequently, the sense of exclusion which the religiously observant often express in the face of what they see as an arrogant, elitist and of course godless intelligentsia and technocracy, may gradually be eroded. A precondition for that to happen, though, is a relatively stable context – Rawls’ ‘well-ordered society’.


Birman, P. (2001). A mirror to the future: the media, evangelicals and politics in Brazil, Paper presented to the seminar on Religion, Media and the Public Sphere, Amsterdam, December.


