

FUNDAMENTALISM AND GLOBALISM

David Lehmann

SUMMARY

The religious traditions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam are all today undergoing a transformation known generically as 'fundamentalist'. Although this term is impossible any longer to define precisely, and although there are obvious differences between the movements to which the label is attached, numerous common features, including the original defining feature of fundamentalism - namely the idea of the inerrancy of a sacred text - remain. Together, these considerations justify an interpretation of contemporary religious transformations in a common framework of analysis, especially when account is taken of their global character. This paper develops such an interpretation by focusing on two aspects of the globalism of fundamentalist movements - their trans-national reach and the role played by globalism in their imaginary projections across time and space. In addition the paper explains the movements' approaches to popular cultural traditions and to religious and sacred texts, and concludes by emphasising both their modernity and, through an account of their treatment of sexuality, the quasi-ethnic character of the multiple strategies of boundary maintenance which set them apart from other bearers of their own traditions and from the outside world generally.

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To speak of globalisation, in a crude, intuitive sense of the word, in the religious field, is hardly to speak of something new: the spread of systems of religious belief, ritual and authority across ethnic, national and linguistic boundaries is as old as religion itself: the history of Christianity and Islam has of course been marked by endless campaigns, violent and non-violent, of conversion and penetration, while its diasporic character and history has become a defining feature of Judaism. This paper is inspired by the truism that contemporary forms of religious expansion commonly, albeit crudely, known as 'fundamentalism', are also distinctively global in reach, and that they are global in several different and partially - but not wholly - overlapping ways because they are imbued with distinctive awareness of their own place in time and space and of the identity of the others among whom they exist and whom they often try to convert.

The starting point of this exposition is a delineation of the way in which globalism has long manifested itself in Catholicism, used as a benchmark against which to set the forms it takes in the various revivals and/or fundamentalisms which have arisen in Christianity, Judaism and Islam. The paper explains what these fundamentalisms have in common and also - not quite the same thing - in what sense they can be described as global at the level of organisation and also of the imaginary. In this way we may find out how they have developed and propagated interpretations of their own presence in different national and cultural milieux, in countries of very different standards of living, in some cases of their own diasporic character, in such a way as to project an image of themselves in relation to other versions of their own religious traditions, and to the varied cultural spaces in which they have made themselves a niche. This interpretation thus goes beyond a notion of sects as blind to their surroundings, trying to preserve their traditions or customs in as pure a way as possible, by showing that they are acutely aware that their presence transcends established boundaries of linguistic and political space, and that this awareness is a central feature of their projection in the modern world.

An approximate definition of fundamentalism is offered, but the issue at hand is not whether, in a platonic sense, the movements described fit an acceptable definition of the word. Rather the paper asks whether there are features common to the movements mentioned which allow us to speak of a religious form which cuts across conventional religious boundaries and draws its particularity from its distinctive insertion in and interpretation of contemporary processes of economic and cultural globalisation.

Globalisation and cultural boundaries: two variants

Whereas economic globalisation is thought to bring about homogeneity and uniformity in methods of management, in economic policies, and above all in the rules of market relationships, cultural globalisation needs to be thought of as an altogether more reflexive, refracted, and multi-faceted phenomenon¹. The relationship between the two is not of the kind which would enable one to say that homogeneity in one sphere engenders homogeneity in the other. Utopias and arcadias, nostalgias and disappointments must be avoided, lest we mourn the loss of cultures without noticing how much in those cultures, indeed in all 'cultures', has been borrowed and lent in the past and survives in borrowed robes. There is now abundant criticism of those who would preach the pickling of objects we call 'the culture of the such-and-such' in the aspic of pop-anthropology or pop-environmentalism without realizing that in the process of doing so they themselves are inevitably, through the preservation process, affecting those cultures. Usually they are bearers of a global social movement; as members of international indigenist or environmentalist networks of activists and NGOs, they are dealing with the conscious human bearers of those 'other' cultures, and thus their intentions and meanings - not to speak of their power and the way they wield it - will be read, marked, learnt and inwardly digested by those 'other' people and, once again, will undoubtedly have an effect on their culture.²

The transposing of images and messages across what were previously taken to be cultural boundaries does not imply that cultures on each side of those boundaries are coming to resemble each other more and more as cultural complexes, or complexes of symbols and shared meanings. Rapid and intense - or sometimes slow and more benign - transmission and adoption of cultural symbols transform the cultural complexes into which they are assimilated, and then find their way out again in a new form on

their way back to the place of origin or on to new locations.³ The interchange of symbols, practices, rituals and ideas does not, in other words, occur in ready-made packages, but in the migration of those symbols, rituals and icons, variously distributed over time and space, so that the outcome of the mixture - even were they all to derive from the very same place of origin, which they do not - is bound to be different in each place of arrival - the place of 'arrival' being in any case but a staging post on an interminable journey. With the transmission of cultural symbols and practices comes a certain idea of their provenance, a projection of another culture, another place, which may be desired or feared, but is projected nonetheless.

Perhaps the earliest instance of how European thought has dealt with these issues is in the early history of Catholicism in Latin America: in the ferocious debates about the *indios* and the legitimacy of their conversion and their servitude, Spanish scholars recognized that they were entitled to the same rights as all other human beings as Bartolomé de Las Casas argued in his defence of the *indios*. While others oppressed and killed on the hypocritical pretext that the indigenous peoples were idolaters or devil-worshippers, Las Casas described their pagan practices as their own way of adoring the same God as the Christians.⁴ Las Casas gained some sympathy for the Indians' plight from the Spanish monarchy, but he lost his battle, yet over the succeeding centuries, the Church found ways of alternately co-opting and repressing practices considered alien to official ritual and theological acceptability, and found willing accomplices and partners within the indigenous populations. In the first half of the 16th century, in a context of war and epidemics, with their catastrophic effects on the demographics and social fabric of Indian society, Indians in what is now Mexico familiarized themselves with and lived up to the stereotypes the Spanish clergy and conquerors had of them: under threat of torture or worse they readily admitted to being idol-worshippers and even fashioned images and idols out of precious stones and gold so as to satisfy the preying curiosity of the Conquerors and their priests. This at least enabled some of them to put an end to their maltreatment, albeit at the cost of severe internal division. Thus in settling their internal disputes, by groups of villagers might betray one another to their new masters with accusations of idolatry.⁵

The cult of the Virgin of Guadalupe, which dates from the 1650s, bears witness to this continuing negotiation. It is not in any sense an accident that it was an *indio*, Juan Diego, who was said to have had the original vision of the Virgin. Over centuries the cult was managed in such a way as to project a special relationship between the Mexican people, and the Church, the figure of Christ and above all the Virgin herself. Consecrated as patron of the Mexican nation by an ephemeral 'Emperor' in 1821,⁶ Guadalupe fulfils numerous symbolic and thaumaturgic or curative functions for the Mexican population, and is said to be the one symbolic representation on which they can all - even the ferociously anti-clerical revolutionaries - agree. In the Papal words which adorn every image of the Virgin, *non fecit taliter omni nationi* - 'He did not do likewise for every nation'.⁷ In other words, the Virgin of Guadalupe is particular to the Mexican people, identified in this tradition with the Indian population, a recognition of their difference and distinctiveness, of their special devotion to the Virgin and to this image of the Virgin.

The Virgin of Guadalupe is but the most celebrated of innumerable local cults all of which bear witness to something broader and deeper than a political tactic on the part of the Church to retain the allegiance of indigenous populations, for it forms part of a pervasive dialectic of the erudite, or the official, and the popular in Latin Catholicism. The notion of a dialectic arises from a dissatisfaction with the 'untouched' or autonomous concept of popular culture accompanied by an awareness that the intellectual construction of 'the popular' itself finds a response from those to whom it is directed - as we can see in the way the new ritual and symbolic - and power - systems were confronted and absorbed by indigenous populations (or what remained of them) in 16th century Mexico.⁸ There is a specifically Catholic aspect to this, which chimes with what can be called the Church's *cosmopolitanism* but stands in contrast to the *globalism* we find in contemporary charismatic and evangelical movements such as the Pentecostals. It also chimes with the project of a 'People's Church' (*Iglesia Popular*) as propagated by grass roots movements in Catholicism in Latin America and the Philippines, inspired in a loose way by the Theology of Liberation. These movements and their spokesmen sometimes caricature the history of the Church since the Conquest as one of persistent neglect of material and political needs of the poor and of indigenous peoples, but they cannot accuse the institution of ritual or aesthetic neglect of the other, or of pursuing a policy of cultural or religious exclusion - on the contrary the Church enters into a multifaceted and often inconsistent relationship with indigenous cultures and religions and the result is the syncretism we observe so often.⁹ It is hardly a meeting of equals - on the contrary the realities of inequality, cultural dominance, and intellectual hegemony all

shape the syncretism but in no way can they be said to destroy indigenous culture, save by those who conceive culture as immobile, unchanging and impervious to 'its' environment. Thus Gruzinski hints that the pervasive belief in and invocation of spirits observed in the Andes and in Mexico can be traced back to the time when indigenous rituals were forced into clandestinity by the persecution of the Church.¹⁰

To clarify the difference between global and cosmopolitan approaches to 'the other', contrast the policies towards paganism and witchcraft in a later period in (Protestant) British colonial Africa and the Brazilian state. Following Yvonne Maggie and Peter Fry we find that the British prohibited witchcraft accusation and penalized it severely - viz. the Rhodesian Witchcraft Suppression Law of 1896 - whereas in the application of Brazil's 1890 Penal Code the suppression of witchcraft was based on the efficacy of those and thus on an assumption that witchcraft itself was efficacious, to be sanctioned only when used to take advantage of people's credulity and especially to extract money from them, or when usurping the medical profession's well protected monopoly.¹¹ Maggie's book chronicles - inevitably - the extreme difficulty of achieving convictions under the Brazilian Law. Likewise, at the turn of the century the Brazilian Church was particularly shrill in its condemnation of 'pagan' practices - i.e. possession cults; but this shrillness has fluctuated over the decades since then, and the reality is that the Church has never enforced its anathema through measures against practitioners or beneficiaries of witchcraft.

Today the relationship between dominant cultures and their others is scarcely the same as it was in 16th century Spain or even 19th century Brazil and Zimbabwe - but some of the themes will not go away. Within Catholic culture and within global social movements - grass-roots-oriented NGOs, the People's Church, environmental movements, movements for the protection of threatened civilisations and the like - a reverential respect for the other, for popular culture and for indigenous societies is cultivated. This occurs in a context where globalisation brings 'the other', in this case especially the 'distant other', into ever-closer contact with the bearers of dominant cultural forms such as the English language, the habits of bureaucracy, and information technology. But like their 16th century forebears, modern cosmopolitans have a theory about their relationship with the other, and it centres on notions of authenticity: the destiny, the survival of the other depends on his ability to hold together as an integral whole, which then imperceptibly can become an integrated cultural package, labelled and categorized and theorized by the spokesmen of international social movements. And although the 16th century friars and bishops did not want to preserve their other, they were the great pioneers of a concept of authenticity in this sense, as evidenced in Las Casas' interpretation of human sacrifice.

According to Anthony Giddens 'the integrity or *authenticity* of a tradition...is more important in defining it as a tradition than how long it lasts...Tradition is bound up with memory, specifically ..."collective memory"; involves ritual; is connected with ... a *formulaic notion of truth*; has "guardians"; and , unlike custom, has binding force which has a combined moral and emotional content'¹² But in the contemporary world this notion of authenticity is carried, so to speak, to a second degree, where the 'theory' already mentioned becomes attached to the traditions in a way which was surely not possible in the pre-Enlightenment world. Giddens, as quoted here, is a bearer of that ideology of the global.

The specificity of the cosmopolitan variant of cultural globalisation is not in the continued acceleration of processes of cultural change and interchange whose history goes back a long way in time, but rather the awareness of otherness which they bring with them, the elements of mimicry, mimesis, irony, self-conscious imitation, revived authenticity - in short in some sense a theory of history which calls upon people of very different language, religion and economic status to think about themselves in relation to others.

This is more than simply the intensification of culture contact. The very notion that cultures have borders can be questioned, and questioned not only for the modern period in which these interchanges have evidently intensified so much. Put another way: the question is whether cultural differences between groups in space are distributed in clusters, whether differences are iterated between cultural spheres - and once the question is put it becomes clear that they are not so distributed: differences in language are not correlated with, or superimposed upon, differences in religion in cuisine or in mechanisms of political allegiance. An analogy could be drawn with language: Italian, Spanish and Portuguese are thought of as different languages, yet it is not clear whether they differ any more from each other - at least in their spoken forms - than the 'English' spoken in Cornwall differs from that

spoken in Newcastle or Glasgow.¹³ Those who would trace or circumscribe patterns of behaviour so as to trace boundaries around group identities are trying to 'engage the wind'.¹⁴

So the notion that 'cultures' have 'boundaries' makes sense only in the context of a notion of the self-representation of collectivities as cultural entities or their representation as such by others. This self-representation in its turn is elaborated, developed and propagated by elites, authorities and spokesmen, in an endless dialectical process whereby shared images and practices are transformed, idealized, momentarily frozen but never fossilized, as they are exchanged between different groups, whose ideologies nevertheless proclaim cultural boundaries as utterly real, tangible and self-evident.

This endless interchange is not, to be sure, 'power-free': to convince others of their identity is itself to exercise power over them - perhaps not overwhelming or exclusive power, but power nonetheless. To attempt to convince them is to make a bid for influence over their lives, even their livelihoods. In a search for and legitimation of authenticity, of faithfulness to roots and origins, the intelligentsia have a prominent role to play - indeed the intelligentsia are usually the main protagonists of this type of search. They reinvent the history, they write it up, popularize, transform it into slogans, emblems and banners; or, as in the case of the People's Church movement, they write the handbooks, the guides and the manuals, they animate seminars and networks, and they raise funds in far-off places. They even adopt practices or rituals in a self-conscious manner across cultures, claiming to preserve respect for the other culture and conserve a conception of the other culture as a unified complex whole.¹⁵

There is the cultivation of authenticity and there is kitsch, and though neither earns high marks for faithfulness of reproduction, the mode of reception differs as between them: the Pentecostals' world-wide evocation, visual and verbal, of the United States depicts a legendary place, an earthly paradise - complete with tinsel and lace. In contrast, when Catholic priests in Africa and now increasingly in Latin America, adopt practices inspired by a doctrine of inculturation, involving the incorporation of indigenous religious rituals or artefacts into the Catholic ritual, they are linking those practices explicitly with a people, a place and a society, seeking, in the words of the late Superior of the Jesuits Pedro Arrupe, not only to express the Christian message in elements proper to that culture, but also to transform it and remake it so as to bring about a 'new creation'.¹⁶

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Fundamentalist and evangelical religious movements present us with a quite different variant on cultural globalisation, on the representation of the other, on dealing with cultural boundaries. They are disconcerting because they seem to cross cultural boundaries with enormous facility yet have no 'theory', they give little thought to the issues which so bedevil cosmopolitans and followers of modern global social (not religious) movements such as those mentioned above.

Fundamentalists borrow profusely but in a manner utterly bereft of the reflexive echoing described here: their implicit rejection of any notion of the wholeness of cultural complexes shocks western and westernized liberal or populist intellectuals, and indeed anyone with a strong sense of history and authenticity, because of the promiscuity of their borrowing and also because they rip the historical dimension out of their account of their own practices and origins while still claiming access to a traditional identity. Thus Pentecostals totally reject the contextual/historical approach to scriptural interpretation, while at the same likening themselves to the early church; ultra-nationalist/orthodox groups in Israel rewrite the history of the Jews in such a way as to reduce the entire diaspora experience to a mere parenthesis. Signs and signified are promiscuously ripped out of context and recombined across time and space. This may be offensive to intellectuals - and may even be intended to be so - but it is a roaring success on the ground.

The scope of the term as used here evidently goes beyond strict definitions which tend to exclude charismatic and Pentecostal sects. In order to justify the characterisation of fundamentalism as a global phenomenon in any more than a trivial sense, it is also necessary to establish that confronting cultural difference and the crossing of cultural boundaries are central features in the growth of fundamentalist and evangelical movements today. Likewise it is necessary to point out the similarities which exist between fundamentalist movements in the different world religions. But whatever the importance of global reach and transcultural presence, it will in the end be necessary to return to our starting point, the level of the imaginary, if we are to establish the analytical importance of globalism in the

interpretation of fundamentalism.

Scope of the term 'fundamentalism'

In using this term I refer to charismatic and Pentecostal or evangelical forms of Christianity, to ultra-Orthodox Judaism and to Islamic revival or renewal (what the French call *intégrisme*). This is not an analytic definition, and it differs from traditional definitions because, as far as Christianity is concerned, scholars have habitually distinguished quite firmly between sects which insist principally on the absolute inerrancy of the Biblical text, and the Pentecostals, who give priority to the gifts of the Spirit. However, today this difference is more one of degree than of kind, since Pentecostals and Evangelicals generally routinely invoke the Bible as an inerrant text worldwide and comparison of churches and movements shows that questions of doctrine are of small significance when distinguishing between them. The days when sects split from one another for reasons of doctrinal detail, as was so common in the United States in the early part of this century, are long since passed. Doctrine is much less important than ritual, symbolism, conversion experiences and the 'change of life' that goes with them. For all their theological significance (though this may stretch the meaning of the word 'theology') and formal institutional reality, these distinctions tend to blur in everyday evangelical rhetoric and apologetics: what counts is the force (not the content) of the invocation of the text, the force of the accusatory evangelical epithet 'anti-biblical', and the punctuation of prayer, sermons and diatribes with chapter and verse references (with or without mention of the contents of chapter and verse, which somehow seem to be secondary). Although this treatment contrasts with the highly legalistic Talmudic approach to texts, there is at the same time an affinity between the esoteric approach to the decipherment of biblical texts adopted by the Kabbalistic tradition and by certain strands in evangelical Protestantism.

This disregard of these established definitional boundaries, of which another example is in the differences separating Jewish ultra-orthodox communities from each other and from their more political cousins on the extreme wing of Zionism, is in the nature of the subject itself. Fundamentalism is in constant, often bewildering, flux, staying somehow 'ahead of the game' as observers (generally accustomed to thinking of religion as a conservative, stable affair and highly resistant to change) struggle to keep up with the mercurial inventiveness of religious entrepreneurship and organisational dynamics. In Judaism the difference between religious ultra-orthodoxy and religiously inspired Zionism ultra-nationalism, especially territorial nationalism, is also blurring, not least because the two tendencies are themselves undergoing important transformations. In Israel the religious parties all support territorial expansion and the paraphernalia of punctilious religious observance are a prominent feature of irredentist West Bank settlement. In Islam likewise 'traditionalist' fundamentalism sponsored by Saudi Arabia and concerned principally with the prevalence of shar'ia in the spheres of civil and criminal law, private morality and marriage shades off into the much more political Islam originating with the Muslim brothers.¹⁷ However, some distinctions remain very important; a contrast must be drawn between the Iranian Revolution, in which a clergy has seized power and there has therefore been no revolution against the religious establishment, and the Islamic fundamentalism of North Africa where a primarily lay movement has over the past fifty years conducted a gradual revolution against the institutions of Islam and its links with the state. Among the defining features which separate fundamentalism in both Christianity and Islam from its opponents is hostility to establishment clerical personnel and their wisdom, and the penetration of society through proselytizing campaigns from the grass roots, so on this basis Iran does not qualify.¹⁸ In Judaism this is more complicated because until recently there was no establishment or official clergy (see below).

Islamic revival movements encompass far more than the headline-hitting fundamentalism and revival in the Middle East, North Africa and Pakistan. In Western Europe there is widespread activism and revival among second and third generation Muslim immigrants: their parents or grandparents came from the Indian sub-continent, from North Africa and from Turkey, and tended to move away from adherence to the prescribed ways of life towards assimilation, in the image of the Jews who came before them; but this new generation have been returning to a more orthodox way of life - again in a trend resembling that found among a noticeable proportion of young Jewish people in Western Europe and North America. In the case of the Muslims, this seems to be related to the dramatic deterioration in employment opportunities and the serious problems of marginality, in France especially, as the European economy has undergone fundamental restructuring. The European Islamic movements involved, in contrast to North Africa and the Middle East, are for the most part not political at all in the

conventional sense of the word, but resemble both the renewal of Jewish ultra-orthodoxy, and in their 'targetting' of those suffering from social exclusion they also resemble the Pentecostals of South America and Africa. (The Jewish renewal, it must be said, has on the face of it relatively little to do with socio-economic problems.)

It is also important to note that even within the Middle East the movements of revival are by no means predominantly committed to the overthrow, let alone violent overthrow, of the state. As Bayat explains, most Islamist activism is at the grass roots and involves NGO-type activity such as health care and basic education, the proliferation of 'non-governmental' - i.e. non-officially certified - mosques, youth associations, co-operatives, athletic clubs - even though para-military activity is also encompassed.¹⁹

The capacity to carry the message and forms of organisation across cultural frontiers; the propagation of the idea of scriptural inerrancy and its anti-intellectual corollary, namely hostility to modern forms of analysis of the Bible and of religious history; the obsession with drawing boundaries between the believers and others, one aspect of which is the control of women and of male and female sexuality; the emphasis on conversion and allied to it the call to individuals to bring about a fundamental change in the way they live their lives, outwardly and inwardly; and the use of modern techniques of organisation and communication; and the 'grass roots', or 'bottom up' approach to proselytism and organisational expansion:²⁰ all of these are common features of fundamentalism. But it is the imaginary dimension sketched out in the preceding paragraphs which distinguishes contemporary charismatic and fundamentalist from earlier forms: the imaginary, convinced that it is recapturing disembedded rituals and symbols, 'cages' them through the use of mechanisms of social and institutional approval and disapproval, precisely because of an awareness of that disembedding, in the creation of a system of rules and regulations which fit in with contemporary notions of what constitutes religious institutionality.

The role of the text

Much is made of the place of biblical inerrancy in fundamentalism, not least by fundamentalist groups themselves, but to analyze the place of the text in the movements under consideration reveals how difficult it is to provide a proper account of the place of the text in them and in their culture. The reason is that there is no such thing as a pure reading of a sacred text: part of the definition of the sacred character of a text is the existence of authoritative interpretations of it, and the existence of authoritative interpretations brings with it the issue of who or what institution confers the authority to interpret and who provides the interpretation. Mainstream Christian Churches all have elaborate institutional arrangements to provide the authorized reading. Priests and pastors are qualified to preach in churches after studying at approved institutions and receiving a qualification. Professional theology is to some extent a speculative discipline, but where it takes place in approved institutions it must respect certain limits. In Islam the position is not dissimilar, except that the state usually has a role in the functioning of institutions such as the Al-Azhar University in Cairo.

There is a sense in which the doctrine of inerrancy dispenses with the need for professional theological expertise or even official authoritative interpretation, because if the truth is there in the text and if no other text can add to the sacred text, then the truth is available to any individual who cares to look with faith and without evil intention. When we observe Pentecostals with their Bibles they are transmitting this message, and they often say precisely that. The essential claim is that the reading is unmediated by experts, academics, scholars or professional theologians. The culture of this milieu is in that sense anti-intellectual. The purer fundamentalists do have experts, but not theologians: they produce a single authorized reading and their followers must accept it. So here we do find a distinction between Pentecostals and traditional Christian fundamentalists. As far as the Pentecostals are concerned the Bible is used as a vast concordance - a repertoire of quotations and stories suitable for the illustration of moral teaching or of practical instruction on the rituals of everyday life. It is not the social scientist's job to decide on the evidence of the content of their interpretations whether one or another church or movement qualifies as fundamentalist: rather his task is to delineate the culture of the institution, and the Pentecostals' culture of chapter-and-verse quotation highlights well the talismanic role played by the sacred text in contemporary fundamentalist movements. Traditional fundamentalists might well be shocked at the creative use of miracle stories, for example, in the preaching of Pentecostal pastors, but that is of no sociological importance: what counts is the presumption among the faithful that the lessons being drawn come direct from the text. This is helped by the directness of the preachers' language - which in my experience among Brazilian Pentecostals has nothing of the formalism or

learned character of the language of Catholic priests, even of the Catholic priests who follow the line of the 'People's Church'.

There are then two dimensions, at least, to the issue of a fundamentalist treatment of texts: is it authoritarian and does it encourage individuals to read and learn from the texts on their own? On the first aspect, it must be clear that it is authoritarian in the sense that there is no debate about the meaning of the texts: such debate would lead immediately to schism, however trivial the disagreements. On the second aspect, if any believer could read what he or she cared to read 'into' a text then there would be no church or movement based on that text. So the question then is 'what is a reading?'

Here a 'reading' is one which is politically or institutionally sensitive for the movement or church in question, and therefore there is plenty of room for interpretation by preachers and individuals who recognize themselves and each other as being part of the movement and its culture. So apart from the negative danger of subversive or contentious uses of the text, what counts positively is the element of sharing common language, discourse and values and commanding the requisite personal authority - thus of using the text to reinforce membership or participation, to reaffirm belonging. So apart from politically sensitive issues, a close inspection reveals much latitude in precise interpretations, and the same can be seen with great clarity among the Chassidim, for whom disagreement is at the heart of a reading of Biblical and Talmudic texts. Commitment to the inerrancy of the text does not guarantee a single uniform interpretation - rather it is expressed in the social context of study and interpretation, just as indigenous healing is embedded in a social context. Among evangelicals the social context is framed by the relationship between a preacher and a following; among Jews by the study group gathered on a regular basis around a Rabbi or teacher, moving between different languages, debating points of law or esoteric correspondence. Membership of the group, and thus observance of the rituals of everyday life prescribed by the community, qualify a person to join in and express opinions. Theological questions in the usual sense of the word are never raised.

This idea that adherence to a culture rather than to a specific message or interpretation of individual passages, is the characteristic of these movements' approach to texts, can be illustrated with reference to Jewish ultra-orthodoxy, customarily referred to as fundamentalist. When Chassidim, for example yeshiva students, discuss and interpret texts they do not look for a message so much as hidden correspondences and in a sense intentions behind it. The Torah - the Pentateuch - is for them divinely 'authored', so although they cannot strictly speaking discuss it in terms of an author's intentions, they allow themselves extensive latitude in discussing what might 'lie behind' a passage and why it is written one way and not the other and so on: the text has an existence which transcends authorship and in a sense is its own author, concealing meanings within itself and behind the apparent meaning, in hidden correspondences and coincidences. The discussions are endless and they draw indistinguishably on an infinity of texts written down any time between about 500 BC and today. Stories have been invented over the centuries as illustrations of points of morality or belief, and they are told as fables or cautionary tales. There is also a vast array of mystical or Kabbalistic speculations which are almost parallel to the Torah - as for example in accounts of the Creation of the World - yet raise no doubts at all in anyone's mind that they may be rivalling the Torah. Their *esprit de corps* and their common lifestyle obviates the need among Chassidim for an interpretative orthodoxy. Mutual trust is sustained by a common setting and a shared symbolic, esoteric and analogical reasoning.

In any case Judaism has no theology in the Christian sense of the word: it simply has a tradition - indeed many traditions - and learned men are called Rabbis because of their erudition or the respect they command: the appearance of certified institutions of learning and recognized Rabbinical offices is a modern invention which arose only in Britain - where the Chief Rabbinate was established by Parliament in the 19th century - and of course in Israel - and in both places these are eminently political offices. Islam is little different - save Sh'ia Islam where there is indeed a clerical hierarchy. Also, in both Judaism and Islam, the twentieth century has seen the emergence of truly charismatic religious figures who have extended their influence far beyond the realms which were those of the Rabbi or Mullah in Eastern European towns and villages since the 18th century or, so far as the Middle East and North Africa are concerned, in the Ottoman Empire. Menachem Schneerson, the leader of the Lubavitch movement was one example, as is Mawdala Muhammad Ilyas, the founder of the *jama'at al tablighi* (Society for the Propagation of the Faith) which from its beginnings in British India has now become a worldwide community of millions of followers.²¹

So when, under the guidance of a Rabbi, these innumerable study groups dispersed across the world

discuss texts and rabbinical teaching and mystical speculations they are not reiterating unchanging truths of doctrine. Much of what they say is not doctrinal at all. Some of it is to do with the minutiae of rules governing everyday conduct - what can one eat, what can one cook, and what is the textual or rabbinic justification for these rules? Some has to do with comments on comments about the intricacies of the text itself - why what is there is there and why what is not there is not there - and since there is always an absence - an alternative question - there is always a point for discussion. The discussion does not have a beginning, a middle and an end; it simply elaborates correspondences and correlations, and comes to an end not when the matter is settled but when it is time for the next activity.

There is therefore, paradoxically, no way in which Jewish textual learning can be described in terms of its doctrine, or even of its content: although the Torah is taken to be the original foundational text, there are innumerable additional ones and there is no common rule which privileges some over others: Lubavitchers privilege the writings of their leaders, others maybe do not read those writings at all. The appropriate characterisation is in terms of a style or method of argument and above all the simple fact of being together and being aware that in coming together one is sustaining a tradition: together with the attention to the text, then, is the attention to the routine of assembling to study it. In doing so, at certain times, in certain places, sometimes in certain types of dress, those involved are making a statement. Learning, then, is a ritual of learning, and it is not surprising that so much of the learning in ultra-orthodox rabbinic training schools (*yeshivot*) is learning by rote. The young men who emerge from these centres are fearfully erudite, knowing acres of Torah and Rabbinic teachings from memory, but their analytic training is in language rather than in textual understanding. They use a vast linguistic repertoire, stretching across Old Testament Hebrew, Aramaic, Modern Hebrew, the rabbinic Hebrew ('Holy Speech') developed in the 18th and 19th century to discuss religious and textual matters, Yiddish, the medieval Hebrew interspersed with French used by Rashi, and written in a distinctive script; plus a repertoire of abbreviations and a range of scripts. They use their perhaps intuitive analytic understanding of languages to undertake a purely text-based reading of the Torah - a text which serves as a springboard for both legal and esoteric speculation.

The distinctiveness of fundamentalist movements, then, as far as their approach to texts is concerned lies in their treatment of authority and in the ritual character of their approach to the text. In Islam the pattern is much the same: 'those who master the texts and the traditional forms of exegesis become the knowledgeable'.²² The term 'inerrancy' with its implication that the interpretation is single and consistent, is anthropologically naive.

The control of female sexuality and other mechanisms of drawing boundaries.

All commentators remark on the prudishness which pervades movements of renewal and return to tradition in the three world religions under consideration – and of course this issue has, together with political nationalism and revolution, dominated media coverage. It is a difficult subject to write for research simply because the movements themselves hide women from prying observers, yet there is reason to ask whether it is adequate to offer a blanket characterisation of them as repressive of women and as movements in which marginalized men seek to reaffirm their power and masculinity.

In the case of Pentecostalism many observers remark on the predominance of women in churches and also on the extent to which women claim that conversion has been followed by their empowerment in the home.²³ In the case of Chassidic Judaism it is worth noting that the Lubavitch movement, the most 'modern' of them all which emphasizes outreach and 'conversion' through the return of secularized Jews to a traditional way of life, or 'Jewishness', provides for separate women's education, through schools, adult education, and even seminaries. Furthermore, the Lubavitch and the Pentecostals accord a prominent role to the wife of the Rabbi and the Pastor, which goes beyond the domestic to include leading women's study and social welfare groups. The present writer's research among Pentecostals in Brazil placed the issue in the specific context of urban poverty, since it is among the urban poor that Pentecostals have had the most visible impact in Brazil and Latin America. This is a context in which women find themselves caught in a home environment from which it is impossible to escape: they are very frequently the principal providers, being unable to rely on the contribution of husbands and partners to the feeding and education of their children, and relying instead on networks of female relatives and *comadres* (godparents of their children); they are also vulnerable to abuse and worse by husbands, partners or even strangers. Street life is dangerous for them. The only institutions apart from the Church in which they can participate are the local social movements or community-management organisations, which are so frequently female-led in Latin America. But although far from negligible,

these organisations are not ubiquitous and often survive only thanks to support from local priests or NGOs. Compared to Pentecostal churches and chapels they are thin on the ground. Catholic church building, vocations and pastoral provision have failed visibly to keep up with headlong urban growth

The Pentecostal church then has become a place where women can have a role in the public sphere without incurring risks, and also where they can go without the men and children who otherwise leave them little or no time or space to themselves. For the churches are adept at treating their members not just as followers but also giving them jobs to do – as minor officiants, maybe to start with the simply as attendants or missionaries, but later allowing them to proceed up the hierarchy, at least to a certain point. There is, however, little doubt that women are either excluded from the rank of pastor or have extreme difficulty in reaching that status, to the point where it is almost impossible, and so the puzzle remains: why if they are badly treated in this respect do women join churches in such vast numbers?

These elements of doubt about women's exclusion overlook the underlying issue, which is not one of opportunities or exclusion, but one of sex. Brazilian Pentecostals summon a rich store of images to portray the woman as temptress, as an instrument of the devil, and also, if it is a man who is speaking, to portray men as somehow feminized by conversion: the image is of a man who has abandoned the world of *macho* behaviour, of drink, violence and fornication. The woman in ultra-Orthodox Judaism is loaded with the imagery not of the devil but of uncleanness related especially to menstruation: Chassidic men live in a constant state of anxiety that they might come into contact with a woman during her menstrual period in a public place like a bus, for example.

Some observers sense that sexual restraints have tended to become more severe among Chassidim and in other fundamentalist cultures, as compared with the past, for example among North American Chassidim.²⁴ Among Pentecostals there have emerged obsessively prudish churches such as the Brazilian Deus é Amor, and the Mexican La Luz del Mundo²⁵, where women have to wear a very modest uniform. The urge to invent ever more restrictions seems to know no limits: the movement within the sects is constantly towards more, not less, restriction of women, or towards new mechanisms of restriction as they adapt to changing circumstances - public transport for example, or opportunities in education or business. Small groups do not necessarily, or even usually, break away but they form little informal nuclei within the sects practising just that much more restriction, whether sexual, or dietary or ritual. Thus the 'average' - if such a word makes any sense in this connection - becomes ever more restricted.²⁶

It is possible that within these movements and communities there is more prudishness than there was a few generations ago. But to make empirical, let alone statistical, sense of that statement, with evidence to hand, is more or less impossible. What counts rather is the constant pressure to draw and tighten the lines, the thresholds, the boundaries. When the majority of Jews in a vast swathe of Eastern Europe from the Baltic to the Black Sea were living in communities and keeping to their rituals as members of those communities, then the vigilance which the boundaries now require would not have made any sense: society itself was drawing boundaries around them - boundaries which eventually turned into the barbed wire fences of concentration camps. There were no non-Jewish boys and girls to marry; there was no unclean meat, there was no consumer society. Islamic revival expresses this difference more visibly precisely because the discriminations inflicted on Jews in Russia and Eastern Europe were not present in the Ottoman Empire against Muslims - or against Jews for that matter...²⁷ Under the Ottoman Empire and in Egypt before the Revolution of the 1950s 'popular' or 'folk' Islam was practised in villages, with its Sufi healers and seers, and they too were subject to attack by the more worldly ulema and the government.²⁸ Both religions have since been through traumas of different kinds. In Algeria the *déracinés*, those uprooted by war and urbanisation, retreated into a 'regressive traditionalism', while the *évolués*, the Algerian equivalent of the successful second and third generation Jews in America and in Israel, acquired what Kepel has occasionally called a *métissage culturel*, they became local scions of European culture.²⁹ After Independence in Algeria, much as in Egypt, Islamism took the form of a purified Islam developing in opposition both to the arthritic and moribund official Islam and the 'uncontrollably magical' variant in the villages.³⁰ Once again boundaries had to be drawn in new circumstances in a manner reminiscent of - though hardly identical to - ultra-Orthodox Jewry after the Holocaust. To be sure, no cultural boundaries are ever 'natural', nor are they ever timeless and unchanging; but in the post-war and post-Independence situation the orthodox in both Islam and Judaism were evidently in a new situation and both found a way of preservation through the invocation of tradition and the reinterpretation of rituals of exclusion and inclusion, of boundary-maintenance based on a reference to tradition. Except that now tradition was not just being maintained, it was being

reconstructed and thus also constructed through a prism of memory, recall, and violent transplantation - from the countryside to the city in North Africa, from Eastern Europe to the United States, Western Europe and Israel among the Jews.

Thus the prescriptions and restrictions have acquired a projective character in which faithfulness to tradition - to 'Jewishness' or *Yiddishkeit* as Jews call it - is a value in itself involving constructing a certain notion of what that tradition is: it is no longer simply doing as it has always been done, but rediscovering how it used to be done and doing it in utterly hostile circumstances.

This explanation is necessary for even beginning to understand any set of restrictions in Islam and Judaism, including the question of female sexuality. Christian Pentecostalism presents different characteristics because it does not draw on a rooted tradition embedded over generations or centuries in a particular time, place and set of social arrangements - indeed in many ways it has a vocation of undoing traditions at various levels - that of ritual, that of the habits of daily life, that of the celebrations of 'faithfulness to origins' embedded in 'popular culture' sponsored by official and semi-official Catholicism.

The literature on these subjects is on the whole unsatisfactory: as far as the notion of tradition is concerned authors simply take it for granted and do not begin to consider its projective character. And as far as female sexuality is concerned, there is a judgmental literature which either praises or condemns the seclusion and restrictions to which women are subject³¹, or is too involved with the author's own experience³², and then there is the majority of analysis which, surprisingly, simply does not attempt to tackle the issue.³³ None is illuminating.

It would be too simplistic to say that these are religious movements led by men whose position is threatened in many ways by the onset of modernisation and who find in the restrictions imposed by fundamentalist interpretation upon their wives and women a solution to their frustration and humiliation. And even if this is appropriate in many individual cases, it still does not exhaust any effort to interpret the movements and above all it does not explain the willing, sometimes enthusiastic, compliance of women themselves - though not of all women, obviously - in the movements.

The restrictions on women must be viewed anthropologically, and should be related to the ethnic or quasi-ethnic character of the movements. Chassidic rules of separation prohibit almost all social contact between unmarried men and women after puberty: the women are separated by a screen (sometimes a one-way mirror) in synagogue or in any place of prayer so that, although they may watch the proceedings, the men cannot see them; men and women sit on opposite sides of the table at meals, sit in different rooms at weddings, attend different study sessions, and are separated by a wall on the rare occasions when they might attend the same study session. This can be explained by a punctilious, not to say obsessive, concern with purity of descent: unregulated sexual conduct can lead to illegitimacy and thus to uncertainty of a person's entitlement to be membership in the Jewish community.³⁴ But when we note that in Pentecostal movements there are also rigorous restrictions on sexual conduct, so that in some churches men and women are seated apart, and that in admittedly extreme cases (the Deus é Amor Church in Brazil is one) prohibit marriage to non-members; or that in Islamist movements, as is well known, women (already when young) are enjoined to wear a headscarf comparable to the wig worn (after marriage) by Chassidic women, we are obliged to ask whether this is not a device of drawing and reinforcement of boundaries.

Indeed, since neither Pentecostalism nor Islam have the same doctrinal problems of 'ethnic purity' there is reason to ask whether in the Jewish case the issue is less one of 'purity of blood' than of accentuating the boundaries and differences separating the community from all outsiders, Jewish or non-Jewish. This receives further support when one notes that the various Chassidic and other ultra-orthodox groups, all together known as *haredim* ('those who live in fear of God'), practice a *de facto* endogamy or even discourage (and therefore pre-empt) marriage outside the limits of the particular sect except with special permission of the sect's leadership. In this case purity of blood is less important than purity of ritual practice and customs, and solidity of the boundaries drawn around the sect or community.

The repression of women's sexuality is one of innumerable devices separating the community from 'the world' (to use now a Pentecostal turn of phrase), and from others. It goes together with forms of dress and more generally with the rituals of everyday life. The Chassidim wear self-consciously dated

and 'located' clothes - for example fur-lined hats in sweltering Jerusalem or in the tropics; the Pentecostals often wear sober grey suits and black ties; the French - and doubtless many other - followers of the *jama'at al tablighi* are led by bearded activists wearing a long light-coloured *djellaba* and turban, and the followers themselves always wear a white skull cap.³⁵

The careful attention to drawing boundaries is expressed not only in dress and sexual control but also in the proclamation of a different way of life, of a transformation brought about in the lives of the convert, or of those - in Judaism and Islam - who have been brought back to the proper practise of the faith and of the tradition. Kepel quotes a preacher describing 'the others' (Muslims or non-Muslims) as 'lost souls' (*égarés*) with their wealth, their power, their video machines, their wine and their women. Breaking the rules of conventional society takes innumerable forms: on the one hand there are ways of scandalizing the public, for example by conducting street campaigns to convert lost Jews and Muslims - a practice common to the followers of *jama'at al tablighi*, of Lubavitch and also of many Pentecostal organisations, or wearing distinctive, even self-consciously outlandish, clothing. On the other hand charismatic and fundamentalist movements may break the rules precisely by behaving in exaggeratedly 'conventional' manner or advocating extreme 'conventional' moral codes, as in prohibitions on tobacco and wine, or on public nudity thus scandalizing by their hostility to a permissiveness which has itself become conventional.

The form of boundary maintenance changes, but its quasi-ethnic character and its function remain, and this construction of a quasi-ethnicity is all the more striking when we note the racial blindness of at least the Pentecostal and Islamic variants. In Brazil Pentecostal churches seem to create a space in which racial discrimination is simply absent - even though the churches do not 'make an issue' of opposing racial prejudice.³⁶

Recent trends among neo-Pentecostals, cast a new light on this issue, as events in Brazil have shown: the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God takes a more tolerant line on women's dress and is trying to appeal to a younger, perhaps more middle class clientele than for example the Deus é Amor (God is Love) church or the Assemblies of God, from which the Deus é Amor is 'descended'. The Universal Church deals with the devilishness of sex in a different way, by propagating a rich imagery (drawn in no small measure from the possession cults sometimes known as 'Afro-Brazilian religions') to depict sexual temptation and threatened family ties, and linking these to an inversion of traditional representations. Traditional Latin and Mediterranean imagery portrays the woman as a weak link in the defence of family honour, in the face of predatory men, and the family honour has been defended by its men, if necessary by violence. In contrast, Pentecostal discourse portrays men as weak and vulnerable to temptation at the hands of powerful women or women possessed by diabolical forces or endowed with magical powers (like *mães de santo*, mediums and priestesses in possession cults) in addition of course to the temptations of the bottle and the street. The wife, or 'female household-head' (since so many are unmarried or for whatever reason are in sole charge of their dependents) is empowered, and responsible, especially if she joins the Church, and portrays herself or is portrayed as a woman who can assert herself over her men.

This development, and others like it, illustrate the mercurial and dynamic character of these movements, and their readiness to take advantage of opportunities - a reality which is difficult for outsiders to conciliate with their perception of backward-looking traditionalism and puritanism. Tradition has to be marketed - even at the risk of turning it into kitsch.

The Universal Church, as so often, provides an unexpected angle on the question of scandalizing and boundary maintenance: its leaders seem to want to create a scandal, as in the notorious incident on their own nationwide television station in 1994 when one of their number maltreated an effigy of Brazil's patron the Madonna of Aparecida,³⁷ in their high-profile use of imagery from possession cults, in their confrontational posture vis-à-vis those same cults, in their barefaced calls for donations, and in their policy of building monumental-style churches in central locations. All this can have many purposes, but one is to enable the Church to delineate a profile of its own: it may differ in its methods of drawing boundaries from preceding generations of Pentecostals, but the adoption of new methods for this purpose shows the ability of this church and others like it to adapt their methods to changing cultural and economic patterns.

Methods of organisation and proselytism

Observers are almost despite themselves surprised when they realize how modern the techniques used

by many movements are. This should not be so surprising: to develop a movement of any kind in the twentieth century requires twentieth century methods - even if that movement is trying to bring about a return to a way of life which proclaims itself to be traditional.

Pentecostal churches in Latin America are at a great advantage with respect to the Catholic Church simply by the fact that they are not burdened with the weight of an ancient institutional apparatus. The larger ones like the Assemblies of God and the neo-Pentecostals like the Brazilian Universal Church of the Kingdom of God have set up training systems which enable even the humblest members to acquire a role in the institution, and to make some progress in the hierarchy. There are limits to this advancement, since the ranks of fully-fledged pastors are small and to reach them in the Assemblies one needs to attend courses from probably quite an early age. Also, the Conventions which govern the Assemblies are led by individuals who keep their positions for decades and are more or less immovable - and when they do move they are often replaced by one of their sons. Neo-Pentecostal organisations are extremely centralized and led by hand-picked members of the leader/founder's entourage. Whereas in the Assemblies of God a pastor may remain identified with his chapel or area for a very long time, neo-Pentecostal organisations rotate them in order presumably to prevent them becoming too closely identified with particular communities. Neo-Pentecostal churches, which place an enormous emphasis on financial contributions by members, offer more explicit financial incentives to those in positions of responsibility, and if the Universal Church is an indicator, they do not either encourage the proliferation of chapels as is the practice in the Assemblies and in many other churches modelled on them. The principle of heredity and centralisation combined with a personality cult is found in an extreme form in the Mexican Luz del Mundo church, based in Guadalajara.

We have noted the frequency with which succession to office in the Assemblies of God and other Pentecostal (but not neo-Pentecostal) churches is by, in effect, inheritance. A similar pattern is observed among the leaders of Chassidic sects. This principle ran into severe difficulties however in the case of the Lubavitch, because of their distinctive mission and the ultra-charismatic, almost messianic aura which they conferred, and still confer, upon their leader, who died in 1994. The Rebbe died childless and in any case he had become unique and irreplaceable. The resultant power structure is shrouded in mystery, but it must be assumed that it has led to a degree of institutionalisation and routinisation of power within this sect, which in any case is now not only a sect but also a worldwide organisation. In contrast with other Chassidic and Haredi³⁸ communities the Lubavitch have in effect a worldwide network of missionaries and yeshivas (Rabbinic training schools) and their missionaries gather annually in New York at Lubavitch Headquarters. The training they give to young men in their schools is designed to produce not just Rabbis but, indeed, missionaries. And their missionaries build outreach programmes to bring secularized Jews back into the fold, back to a Jewish way of life, emphasizing not so much learning as the practice of the rituals of daily life. Their hope, no doubt, is that the children of those they bring back to the fold will undergo the rigorous religious education which will make them into truly learned and practising Jews.

The worldwide organisation is bound together also by a vast kinship network. These are the 'spinal chord' of Lubavitch - or Chabad³⁹ as it is also known. They mostly come from very large families in which the children are educated from the cradle for the rabbinate, or to be the wives of Rabbis. Their secular education is the essential minimum and from the age of about 16 the children of activists (mostly qualified Rabbis) study only religious matters and Rabbinical texts. Since they themselves and their parents come from very large families, in which it is usual to have more than 10 children, they have a vast array of cousins, and these cousins are likely to be part of the organisation, stretched across the world. So from one point of view the Lubavitch represent a modernisation within Chassidism, because they evidently have a large organisation which collects and allocates resources to a range of activities - training, publishing, travelling, missions and much else besides. Yet on the other hand they seem to rely on family ties to hold much of it together; but it must also be the case that in many ways these numerous offspring are brought up by the sect as much as by the family: the full-timers are not wealthy, and when they are spread across the world they may well live in houses or apartments owned by the organisation. Their children are sent to study away from home if there is not a suitable school in the vicinity, and so they live with cousins, uncles, aunts and the like.

There is much in common between Lubavitch and the *jama'at al tablighi* described by Kepel in his study of Islam in France. Both are worldwide proselytizing organisations trying to bring the faithful back to the fold. Both place strong emphasis on the practice of the rituals of everyday life; both tend to occupy spaces in urban niches such as the (formerly Jewish) neighbourhood of Belleville in Paris and

Stamford Hill in London - which the Lubavitch share with other Chassidic communities. Both also seem to cultivate a devoted core of activists whose lives are entirely devoted to the organisation and the cause, at the centre of a movement which pays much attention to the regulation of its followers' daily lives, and thus also to the provision of the social, commercial and physical infrastructure necessary to sustain that way of life, in the shape of mosques and synagogues (in both cases often utterly simple and unadorned, even dingy in character), specialized or ritually clean shops, and neighbourhoods to which the faithful are drawn. In this respect the Pentecostals are not the same, at least in predominantly Christian countries: it would not be surprising, though, if in countries where Christianity is in a minority such patterns of residential concentration do develop.

Conclusion

The overall picture is a tantalizing one: a large number of movements, which on account of their genealogy and common culture can be grouped into a handful of tendencies within the world religions, seem to merit the epithet 'fundamentalist', so long as one does not try to define it too tightly. There seem also to exist a series of characteristics which are not exactly common to all these movements but are widely shared among many of them. This paper has mentioned some of these but there are many more - for example the influences of New Age ideas and practices as in the occasional conflation of the role of religious leader and healer in Pentecostal and Chassidic circles. It would be foolish to claim that all fundamentalist movements are the same, or even that they have common causes; but to deny that they have striking similarities would be to flee from a highly creative challenge to social and anthropological analysis.

The interpretation of these similarities is still in its infancy. The study of the subject still tends to be in the hands of either specialists lacking a comparative approach or comparativists lacking religious or linguistic insight. In the current fashion for inserting globalism into all explanations the interest of this subject is not so much that it can be explained by globalisation, but rather that those involved in these religious movements themselves have a distinctive perception and awareness of globalisation and of relating to either those they take to be their own predecessors in time or those situations and practices they deem to be the same in other locations across space. In contrast to the cosmopolitanism of the Catholic tradition, this is a religious form in which rituals and symbols are disembedded and readopted across time and space; in Judaism and Islam especially a mechanism of projection operates whereby discursive constructions enable individuals, institutions and movements to identify with imagined others who are separated from them by generations or by thousands of kilometres. Thus Pentecostal and Islamist movements which proclaim themselves to be ferociously traditional are at the same time engaged in an onslaught against local, historically or traditionally constructed popular cultures, and thus also multi-cultural archipelagos of common allegiance, replete with common texts, rhetorical techniques and organisational methods can arise stretched across a multi-cultural world.

All this cannot be explained by structural factors: the notion that displaced, deracinated populations are particularly open to the proselytism of these movements are inadequate, not only because there are innumerable displaced and deracinated people who are not converted, but also because these phenomena are present in so many different cultural settings and so many different socio-economic strata. Thus the explanation must also have recourse to the use of modern methods of organisation and marketing, and indeed of the use of targeting in reaching particular social groups - students from migrant families in Cairo, young Jews in London, the elderly and extremely poor in the great conurbations of Brazil. These differences exist with and between religious traditions, and between social classes within individual countries, and underline the global character of the phenomenon.

Finally, the movements have in common a variety of mechanisms which serve to draw and strengthen the boundaries which separate them off from 'neighbouring' groups and from the rest of society. Although there is no doubt that the control of female sexuality has been an important feature apparently of all fundamentalisms, there is reason to believe that in different ways some groups are finding roles for women and that some neo-Pentecostal churches are contributing to their empowerment in the home or family context. More to the point, though, is the observation that such restrictions must be seen in the context of this boundary maintenance which makes of fundamentalist movements a quasi-ethnicity - racially blind but nevertheless an ethnicity of a different hue.

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¹Appadurai, A.: 'Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy', *Theory, Culture and Society*, (2-3), 295-310.

² See the criticisms of Arturo Escobar: *Encountering Development: the Making and Unmaking of the Third World*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995 in David Lehmann: 'An opportunity lost: Escobar's deconstruction of development', *Journal of Development Studies*, 33,4, 1977, pp. 568-578. Other examples include Jackson's critique of Vandana Shiva's mixture of feminism and environmentalism: C. Jackson: 'Gender analysis and environmentalisms', in M. Redclift and T. Benton (eds.): *Social Theory and the Environment*, London, Routledge, 1994.

³ A wonderful example is the way in which African habits of body movement when praying or imprecating divine entities found its way into American evangelical practice first as 'shuffling', later as shaking, quaking or simply body movement, and then on into twentieth century evangelical churches and now back to Africa and populations of African origin in the Americas born by largely white missionaries. see Albert J Raboteau, *Slave religion: the 'Invisible institution' in the antebellum South*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1978. Françoise Barbira-Friedman has described how shamans in the Peruvian Amazon, whose practices are as much Spanish-colonial as indigenous in origin, are teaching Californians the secrets of their trade' Claudia Roden (*A Book of Middle Eastern Food*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1968; *The Book of Jewish Food*, New York, Knopf, 1996) has shown how cooking thought of as 'Jewish' deserves that title only because the Jews in their migrations have brought it from one place to the other: it is 'really' Polish, Russian, Yemeni etc. - but of course in New York, São Paulo, or Johannesburg it is 'truly' Jewish. (In Israel it is nothing - indeed it is barely edible at all.) Ritual acceptability is a necessary but by no means a sufficient condition for the description; 'food' is kosher, cuisine is Jewish. In religion the examples of borrowing are infinite and endless: from the churches of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God in Brazil which seem designed to imitate the Temple at Jerusalem to the adoption of Anglican-style choirs and organs by British Jewry in the 19th century, to the complex and multi-levelled interchanges between Pentecostals and Catholicism on the one hand or possession cults (in Brazil or indeed among indigenous groups elsewhere) on the other. see various sources including Patricia Birman: 'Mediation feminine et identités pentecôtistes', *Problèmes d'Amérique Latine*, 24, janvier-mars 1997 (trans. forthcoming in *Cambridge Anthropology*, 1998.)

⁴ David Brading, *The First America: the Spanish Monarchy, Creole Patriotism and the Liberal State*, Cambridge University Press, 1991; Gustavo Gutierrez, *En Busca de los pobres de Jesucristo: el pensamiento de Bartolomé de las Casas*, Salamanca, Sigueme, 1993 (English translation: *Las Casas: in search of the poor of Jesus Christ*,; translated by Robert R. Barr, Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1993.)

⁵ Serge Gruzinski, *La guerre des images: de Christophe Colomb à Blade Runner*, Paris Fayard, 1989, p.95-6.

⁶ Feliz Báez-Jorge, 'La Virgen de Guadalupe', in *Mitos Mexicanos*, Enrique Florescano (ed). Mexico: Aguilar, 1990

⁷ Brading, *op.cit.* p.348.

⁸ David Lehmann, *Struggle for the Spirit: Religious transformation and Popular Culture in Brazil and Latin America*, Oxford, Polity, 1996 pp.163-173.

⁹ The days when this symbolic and ritual profusion could be dismissed as ideological manipulation-as theologians of liberation used to say, are long since passed.

¹⁰ Thus the 'hommes-dieux dont les noms évoquent les grandes divinités' and who 'guérissent, agissent sur les éléments et reçoivent les honneurs d'ordinaire destinés aux dieux de pierre' (*op.cit.* p.98). In the place of idols (gods of stone) proto-shamans or mediums (man-gods).

¹¹ Maggie, Yvonne, *Medo do feitiço: relações entre magia e poder no Brasil*, Rio de Janeiro, Arquivo Nacional, 1992; Peter Fry, *Spirits of Protest: Spirit-Mediums and the Articulation of Consensus among the Zezeru of Southern Rhodesia*, Cambridge University Press, 1976.

¹² Anthony Giddens: 'Living in a post-traditional society', p.63 in Ulrich Beck, Scott Lash and Antony Giddens: *Reflexive modernisation: politics, tradition and aesthetics in the modern social order*, Oxford, Polity, 1995.

¹³ Recently researchers who have begun to question the unique otherness of Hungarian as distinguished from other European languages have come up against a particularly strong version of cultural homogeneity among Hungarian linguists - some of whom are probably quite unaware that the entire

doctrine of Hungarian and Finnish uniqueness was encouraged by Stalin for geo-political purposes. (It is not by accident that both countries were buffers of the old Soviet Union.)

¹⁴ John Borosky, 'Cultural possibilities', in *World Culture Report 1998: culture, creativity and markets*, Paris UNESCO, 1998, p. 64.

¹⁵ Examples of this range of practices abound in day-to-day and journalistic information, but are also now being more systematically documented. Thus a recent article describes the establishment (by an anthropologist) of a shamanistic centre in the US using techniques or procedures borrowed from the Shuar people, but simultaneously imperceptibly shifting the accompanying discourse into the language of psychotherapy and New Age incantation: see Paul C. Johnson: 'Shamanism from Ecuador to Chicago: a case study in New Age ritual appropriation', *Religion*, 25,2, April 1995.

¹⁶ Aylward Shorter, *Towards a Theology of Inculturation*, London, Geoffrey Chapman, 1988, p.11.

¹⁷ Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, London, I.B.Tauris, 1994.

¹⁸ Asef Bayat, 'Revolution without movement, movement without revolution: comparing Islamic activism in Iran and Egypt', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 40,1, January 1998.

¹⁹ Bayat, *op.cit.*

²⁰ This feature is given much importance by Gilles Kepel, *The revenge of God: the resurgence of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism in the modern world*, trans. Alan Braley, Cambridge, Polity, 1994,

²¹ Gilles Kepel: *Les banlieues de l'Islam: naissance d'une religion en France*, Paris, Seuil, 1987

²² Samuel C. Heilman, 'Parallels between Islam and Judaism', in Martin Marty and R.Scott Appleby (eds.): *Fundamentalisms Comprehended, (The Fundamentalism Project, volume 5)*, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1995.

²³ David Lehmann, *op.cit.*; Elizabeth Brusco, 'The Reformation of machismo: asceticism and masculinity among Colombian Evangelicals', in David Stoll and Elizabeth Garrard-Burnett (eds.), *Rethinking Protestantism in Latin America*, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1993. See also John Burdick, *Looking for God in Brazil: the Progressive Catholic Church in Urban Brazil's Religious Arena*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993.

²⁴ Jerome Mintz, *Hasidic People: a place in the New World*, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1992, p.60

²⁵ Angela Renée de la Torre, *Los Hijos de la Luz: discurso, identidad y poder en la Luz del Mundo*, Guadalajara, ITESO/CIESAS. 1995

²⁶ 'From the time I can first remember I heard [my father] repeat the phrase - "it is forbidden"'; Isaac Bashevis Singer: *Shosha*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1980

²⁷ More than half the populaton of Salonica was Jewish from the expulsion from Spain in 1492 until the First World War. Edgar Morin, *Vidal et les siens*, Paris, Seuil, 1989.

²⁸ Michael Gilsenan, *Recognizing Islam: an antropologist's introduction*, London, Croom Helm, 1983, p.113.

²⁹ Kepel, *op. cit* 1994, p.215ff.

³⁰ Gilsenan *op.cit.*p. 150ff.

³¹ Fatima Mernissi, *Beyond the veil: male-female dynamics in modern Muslim society*, London, Al Saqi, 1985; Brusco *op.cit.*;

³² Tamar El-Or, *Educated and Ignorant: Ultraorthodox Jewish Women and their World*, Boulder and Lodnon, Lynne Reiner, 1994.

³³ It would be demagogic to suggest that this is because the authors are mostly men. The real reason is more likely that observers are truly disconcerted by the treatment of women in fundamentalist Judaism and Islam especially and prefer to pigeon-hole the entire issue as one of ideology rather than analyzing its place in the social construction and delimiting of fundamentalist culture. cf Samuel Heilman:

Defenders of the Faith.: Inside Orthodox Jewry, New York, Schocken Books, 1992; Gilles Kepel, *op.cit.* 1987; even in a chapter devoted to the controversy of the wearing of the headscarf in French schools, Kepel does not ask any questions about the place of women in Islam or among the resurgent Islamists in France, restricting himself to a discussion of the issue in terms of its political repercussions for inter-communal relations and ideological positions in France: Gilles Kepel, *A l'Ouest d'Allah*, Paris, Seuil, p.252 ff.

³⁴ Or rather - to membership without prior conversion. Ultra-orthodox Jewish communities and sects regard converts as an exceptional case, and some may absolutely prohibit it, while others allow and even conduct it. The point here though is that knowledge of a person's descent is absolutely essential, and starts with knowledge of their name. In this world-view, there are 'Jewish' family names, and 'non-Jewish' ones.

³⁵ Kepel, 1987, p.177-8.

³⁶ This point is emphasized, with field data in support, by John Burdick *op.cit.*.

³⁷ For a full account see Patricia Birman and David Lehmann, Religion and the media in a battle for ideological hegemony; the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God and *TV Globo* in Brazil' ms.

³⁸ The distinction is not entirely academic, but to explain it is not easy: when the Chassidic way of life first developed in the late 18th century in Lithuania and Poland it was fiercely attacked for its 'pagan' and mystical features by its opponents who regarded the life of a devout Jew as being exclusively one of study. These disagreements persist, for example in Israeli politics (see Menachem Friedman etc.). *Haredim* is the more all-encompassing term.

³⁹ The word Chabad is based on an acronym of the first letters of the Hebrew words for wisdom, understanding and knowledge..